The American Commercial Religion by Hamoudi, Haider Ala
\\jciprod01\productn\D\DPB\10-2\DPB203.txt unknown Seq: 1 26-JAN-12 9:49
The American Commercial Religion
Haider Ala Hamoudi*
I. INTRODUCTION
While there is no shortage of work that might describe the Federal
Constitution as a form of sacred text,1 or constitutionalism generally as
being driven by faith more than rational adherence,2 the notion of a
commercial law faith driven by a sacred text is comparatively unex-
plored.  The generally undiscussed assumption seems to be that com-
merce, being about money, is inherently grounded in rational
concerns, divorced from the type of reverence one affords to a sacred
text and stripped of the type of largely unquestioning obeisance that
attaches at least to more conservative manifestations of religious faith.
Yet the assumption, this Article shall show, is in many fundamental
ways quite wrong.
Far from being any sort of ordinary law organizing commerce, the
Uniform Commercial Code in fact is our godhead, our sacred founda-
tional document, our Holy Book of modern commerce, which brought
us a form of economic enlightenment from the pre-Code Days of Ig-
norance.3  We often refer to it as the “Code,” for no more description
is necessary, any more than a believer need elaborate on the text re-
ferred to as the “Book” when discussing Sacred Text among fellow
believers.  While the Code has been subject to revisions in the manner
that a Sacred Text is generally not, it should be noted that revisions by
the disciples of the appointed prophets who served as original drafters
have become increasingly difficult, as would be expected of any Holy
* Assistant Professor of Law, University of Pittsburgh School of Law.  I would like to thank
Ron Brand, Vivian Curran, Harry Flechtner, George Taylor, and the members of the University
of Pittsburgh junior faculty forum (specifically Jessie Allen, Mirit Eyal-Cohen, Jessie Allen,
Charles Jalloh, Jan Osei-Tutu, Michelle Slack) for their generous comments and support. Any
and all errors are my own.
1. See George P. Fletcher, Three Nearly Sacred Books in Western Law, 54 ARK. L. REV. 1,
2–11 (2001).
2. One of the most influential such accounts is, of course, the magnificent work of Sanford
Levinson on the subject. See generally SANFORD LEVINSON, CONSTITUTIONAL FAITH (1988).
3. The reference is Muslim, in Arabic jahiliyya, and refers to the practices of Arabia prior to
the appearance of Muhammad and the delivery of the Qur’an to him though the archangel
Gabriel. NOAH FELDMAN, AFTER JIHAD: AMERICA AND THE STRUGGLE FOR ISLAMIC DEMOC-
RACY 43 (2003).
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Book as its life lengthens and attachment to it deepens.4  The revision
process, we are told, is increasingly “heated” and “partisan,”5 some-
thing by implication, and with the sweetest irony, we seem to believe
had not been the case when Realist prophets named Llwellyn and Gil-
more put pen to paper.6  Given these trends, the Code may in the
future become all but unamendable.
Not necessarily comfortable equating our faith in the Code with re-
ligious faith, which is not often defended on the basis of reason, we
commercial lawyers are quick to defend our beliefs as inherently ra-
tional by touting the Code’s benefits.  Put differently, the reasons for
our adherence, we insist, simply relate to the fact that the Code works
to maximize commercial and economic benefit.  This is not some sort
of religious adoration of the sacred, we tell ourselves, but rather the
rational pursuit of material gain.
In keeping with these ideas, we describe the Code’s language as
clear and definite.7  However, the commitment of the believer to text
on bases other than rational may be involved here, for our courts at
least at times commit themselves to the urtext8 as if it were somehow
clear and definite even as to provisions that we, indeed even as the
prophet-drafters themselves, acknowledge to be anything but clear.9
4. See infra Part II(B)(3).
5. DOUGLAS G. BAIRD ET AL., COMMERCIAL AND DEBTOR-CREDITOR LAW: SELECTED STAT-
UTES 1 (Thomson Reuters/Foundation Press 2010).
6. The irony, of course, stems from the fact that it was the Realists themselves who suggested
that both the creation and interpretation of law can not realistically be insulated from external
influences, including the political. OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, JR., THE COMMON LAW 1 (1881).
As Holmes stated,
The life of the law has not been logic; it has been experience.  The felt necessities of the
time, the prevalent moral and political theories, intuitions of public policy, avowed or
unconscious, even the prejudices which judges share with their fellow-men, have had a
good deal more to do than the syllogism in determining the rules by which men should
be governed.
Id. See also AMERICAN LEGAL REALISM 3–4 (William W. Fisher III, Morton J. Horowitz, &
Thomas A. Reed, eds. 1993) (describing the preceding Holmes passage as being “inspirational”
to most Realists).
7. Arthur Linton Corbin, The Uniform Commercial Code–Sales; Should It Be Enacted?, 59
YALE L.J. 821, 824 (1950); Taylor v. Roeder, 360 S.E.2d 191, 195 (Va. 1987) (“The U.C.C. intro-
duced a degree of clarity into the law of commercial transactions which permits it to be applied
by laymen daily to countless transactions without resort to judicial interpretation.”).  The UCC
defines one of its premier aims as being to “clarify” the law.  U.C.C. § 1-103(a)(1) (2011).
8. The urtext refers to an original unadulterated (and most authentic) text, prior to changes or
editions having been made thereto. COLLINS ENGLISH DICTIONARY: COMPLETE AND UNA-
BRIDGED (5th ed. 2003).  In the context of the UCC, this would mean the text produced by the
drafting institutions, free of the adulterations of the various state legislatures.
9. See infra Part IV(B) (indicating that an example of near spiritual adherence to the language
of section 2-207 in the absence of any rational defense for it is provided in the case of Filanto,
S.p.A. v. Chilewich Int’l Corp., 789 F. Supp. 1229 (S.D.N.Y. 1992)). As any first year Contracts
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The Code, we also say, is modern and practical.  It dispenses with cum-
bersome common law artifacts (such as, to use only examples as they
arise in Article 2 of the U.C.C., the pre-existing duty rule,10 require-
ments of mutuality,11 and attributions of title12) and imposes in their
place rules that appear to reflect well the manner in which commercial
actors deal with one another.
And so it may well be, for the most part, simple and clear, practical
and modern.  However, its greatest benefit, at least from an economic
and commercial perspective, is not as much the reason for our faith in
it, but rather the product thereof.  It is, as its name indicates, uniform.
Simplicity and clarity, practicality and modernity, serve little purpose
if there existed fifty disparate versions of it throughout the United
States.  This is not so with the Code.13  In marked contrast to the re-
sults of other uniform law processes sponsored jointly by the Ameri-
can Law Institute (ALI) and the National Conference of
Commissioners on Uniform State Laws (also known as the Uniform
Law Commission, or ULC),14 where efforts to achieve uniformity
have reached results that vary from mild success to as abysmal a fail-
student knows, section 2-207 is perhaps among the worst examples of turgid and opaque lan-
guage in the entire Code, so awful that even Grant Gilmore, a principal draftsman of the U.C.C.,
described it as a “miserable, bungled, patched-up job.”  Letter from Grant Gilmore, Professor,
Vt. Law Sch., to Robert S. Summers, Professor, Cornell Univ. Law Sch. (Sept. 10, 1980), as
reprinted in James J. White, Contracting Under Amended 2-207, 2004 WIS. L. REV. 723, 724
(2004) [hereinafter Gilmore Letter].
10. See Wis. Knife Works v. Nat’l Metal Crafters, 781 F.2d 1280, 1285–86 (7th Cir. 1986) (cit-
ing U.C.C. § 2-209 (2011)) (indicating that the pre-existing duty rule is the historic common law
rule that one must supply additional consideration in order for a modification to a contract to be
effective, a requirement dispensed with by section 2-209 of the U.C.C.).
11. William L. Prosser, Open Price in Contracts for the Sale of Goods, 16 MINN. L. REV. 733,
734–36 (1932) (indicating that the requirement of mutuality often prevented enforcement of
contracts such as those containing open price terms).  Prosser stated,
It has been a settled rule, since the early civil law, that the price must be fixed with
reasonable certainty.  But this rule is subject to the qualification, which has caused end-
less confusion in contracts decisions, that in certain ill-defined situations the court will
remove all certainty by supplying an implication that the parties agree to do what is
reasonable.
Id.  (citations omitted). See U.C.C. § 2-305 cmt. 1 (1962) (indicating that this has been replaced
by U.C.C. section 2-305 which permits such contracts, and that the previous doctrine restricting
enforcement of open price term contracts was being rejected).
12. Corbin, supra note 7, 825–27 (indicating that the common law used the term “title” to
provide some form of illusion of certainty as to ownership of goods, where the Code focuses on
operative facts and legal results pertaining to ownership rather than ascribing some value to the
fact that someone possesses some metaphysical attribution of “title”).
13. MARION W. BENFIELD, JR. & MICHAEL M. GREENFIELD, SALES 5 (5th ed. 2006).
14. See discussion infra Part II (describing the role of these sponsoring organizations in the
uniform law processes).
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ure as could possibly be imagined,15 the strict and near-total universal
uniformity of the Code as enacted across all of the states, the District
of Columbia, and the U.S. Virgin Islands is nothing short of
breathtaking.
Yet this might well prove too much.  It might demonstrate that
something beyond the rational is at work.  That is, perhaps the great-
est evidence for the totemic value of the words of the Code’s urtext is
at times irrational rigor of the uniformity that is demanded.  These are
fifty separate state sovereigns, after all, under widely varying political,
economic and social circumstances.  One might expect a state behav-
ing rationally so as to maximize its own benefit (or even a set of politi-
cians within a state acting purely in self interest so as to satisfy local
influences) and to adhere to uniformity as a general matter inasmuch
as commercial matters are concerned.  However, one would surely
also expect such a state to dispense with uniformity when it did not
seem to lead to efficient results, or when interest groups that might be
strong in that state demanded a different result.  This might be a fair
characterization of the manner in which other uniform laws are ap-
proached on a state-by-state basis given the less than rigorous adher-
ence afforded them.16
Our attachment to the Code, however, runs far deeper and resem-
bles more that of the religious believer, who would never hear of such
nonuniformity in matters of faith.  Religion comes in many forms, of
course, and adherence to them, particularly in this vast, diverse coun-
try of ours, is by no means uniform.  Nevertheless, focusing on its
more conservative and traditionalist manifestations, “fundamentalist”
religion let us (reductively) call it for now for lack of a better term,
inspires a certain rigor in its rules and application that plainly exceed
those that might be defended in all contexts on the basis of utility or
reason. They are grounded instead in the notion of obedience to Di-
vine Command.  One may not persuade a deeply committed Jew that
the requirement for not working on shabbat might be moved from
Saturday to Sunday on one week for reasons relating to weather, nor
15. See Legislation, UNIFORM L. COMMISSION, http://www.nccusl.org/Legislation.aspx (last vis-
ited Nov. 21, 2011) (indicating the uniform laws and their state by state legislative enactments).
See also infra Part II(A) (discussing specific examples of moderate failures and successes).
16. Cf. Larry E. Ribstein & Bruce H. Kobayashi, An Economic Analysis of Uniform State
Laws, 25 J. LEGAL STUD. 131, 132 (1996) (featuring a law and economics approach to the uni-
form laws processes and arguing that states generally adopt those uniform law proposals that are
most efficient, but that there are times when the ULC does manage to influence adoption of less
efficient uniform laws, particularly with part time legislatures whose own capacities at lawmak-
ing are necessarily diminished and who might therefore be more amenable to using the products
promulgated by the ULC).
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could one persuade a committed Muslim the same respecting the Fri-
day prayers.  It is not a question of doing that which might seem on its
surface more reasonable, it is submission to the Will of an Almighty
who has commanded otherwise.
Something similar is at work as concerns our commitments to the
Code, and to the maintaining of strict uniformity thereof.  We view the
tampering of the Word with grave concern.  Far from considering mi-
nor state-by-state nonuniform deviations from the Code’s text to be
reasonable, efficient or salutary applications of Justice Brandeis’ state-
as-laboratory metaphor,17the deviations are a form of disobedience,
almost an apostasy.  They are akin to declaring that while the only
deity that exists is God, there is an Apostle after Muhammad.18
Under such circumstances, and understanding the nature of its trans-
gression as having been of a religious nature, a state may well retreat,
recanting its heresy to the Church Galileo-like and returning to the
fold.19  Or it may persist in its blasphemy, thereby prompting urgent
calls for the high priests to find a way to heal the schism.20  But when
the matter is so framed, it is fair to describe deviations as rare and
forced to the margins.  It would almost surely not be so in the absence
of this commercial religion.
While there is no shortage of discussion on faith in matters of con-
stitutional law in particular,21 similar faith-like conduct in the area of
commercial law and regulation22 is difficult to identify elsewhere.  We
17. New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
18. The reference here is to the Muslim profession of faith, in which it is declared that there is
no deity but God, and Muhammad is God’s Messenger.  Revisions to this that suggest that
Muhammad may well be Messenger, but that there is another following him have been received
among Islamist groups with strong hostility. See RUDOLPH PETERS, CRIME AND PUNISHMENT IN
ISLAMIC LAW: THEORY AND PRACTICE FROM THE SIXTEENTH TO THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY
158 (2005) (describing the persecution of the Ahmadiyya sect in Pakistan).
19. See infra Part II(B)(1).
20.  See infra Part II(B)(1).
21. See infra Part II(C).
22. There are, of course, familiar criticisms of “free market fundamentalism” offered by
George Soros, Joseph Stiglitz and others respecting a belief in the sanctity of free markets as
functioning effectively in all instances and requiring an absolute minimum by way of legal regu-
lation.  Nick Beams, Soros Warns of “Market Fundamentalism,” WORLD SOCIALIST WEB SITE
(Dec. 22, 1998), http://www.wsws.org/articles/1998/dec1998/soro-d22.shtml; Brian Snowdon,
Redefining the Role of the State: Joseph Stiglitz on Building a ‘Post-Washington Consensus’,
2 WORLD ECON. 45, 48 (2001) (describing Stiglitz’s skepticism), available at http://www2.gsb.
columbia.edu/faculty/jstiglitz/download/2001_World_Economics.pdf. See also ROBERT H. NEL-
SON, ECONOMICS AS A RELIGION: FROM SAMUELSON TO CHICAGO AND BEYOND (2001).  While I
freely admit having been inspired to describe Code obedience as “fundamentalist” on the basis
of such work, the model of “market fundamentalism” is different from that described herein.
Here we speak of religious-like adherence to a particular model of legal regulation, one that
betrays some level of affinity to “free market fundamentalism” to be sure, but also transcends it
in its demand for obedience to one single text as Word.  American preferences for rules respect-
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are not accustomed in our times to thinking of matters of commerce
being driven by religious adherence.  Nevertheless, Islamic finance of-
fers a convenient analogy.  There, likewise on the basis of Sacred Text
and derivations of medieval provenance, an entire practice has been
woven, and broad convergence achieved, all on the basis of adherence
to God’s Law, with deviations no less tolerated, and recanting no
more likely, than with the Code.23
And, yet, as concerns uniformity and the Code, is this a problem?
After all, uniformity brings state-by-state convergence on commercial
text that is clear and simple, modern and practical.  If state-by-state
convergence is by and large (even if demonstrably not in every single
instance) a good thing, then should it matter whether or not this con-
vergence has been achieved on the basis of rational calculation of eco-
nomic good or as some form of obedience to sacralized Holy Text?
May we not judge the matter solely by its outcome and not concern
ourselves with the balance?  If we do, can there be any doubt that
what has been achieved by any rational measure has been wildly suc-
cessful even if the adherence demonstrates something else to have
been at work to achieve it?
This brings us to the nub.  Let us assume for now that our religious
faith in our Code has been over the past several decades salutary, and
there are good and plenty reasons to believe that, and that the uni-
formity that is its product has on balance permitted massive economic
progress, a nugget of conventional wisdom I choose not to question.
Still, now that the Code has achieved all of this for America, it might
be time to face more a central drawback in this rapidly globalizing
world, of which America is only a part, and a necessarily diminishing
one (by which I do not presage America’s decline, but only mean to
suggest that its portion of the world’s economic output will necessarily
decrease as the developing world advances).  The problem is not that
we have been economically harmed by our faith in our Code but
rather, to get to the thesis of this paper, that a near fundamentalist
obedience to our Code as religious dogma has hindered the very type of
global uniformity, and the attendant benefits thereto, that it continues to
enable in the domestic context.
ing burden of proof in matters of warranty, for example, have nothing to do with preferences for
a free market over legal regulation; it is hard to imagine why a “free market fundamentalist”
would prefer to place the burden on the buyer or the seller. See discussion infra Part IV(A).
Rather, what is being demonstrated is an American commercial adherence to its own Code, held
in near sacred reverence, over any other form of potential regulation.
23. See infra Part (II)(C).
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So even if our obedience to our Code could be described as ration-
ally and economically beneficial domestically, our inability to reach
any form of convergence globally must be described as something of
the opposite.  Stated differently, to the extent that it is true in the
domestic context that uniformity brings prosperity, it would be many
times truer in the global one.  Convergence (if not entire uniformity,
fairly dismissed as a hopeless endeavor given broadly disparate norms
and values as concerns matters of commerce) would inure to the bene-
fit of all, and yet to describe such an ambition as far from realized is to
understate the matter considerably. Therefore, those who defend the
Code on the basis of economic prosperity are in something of a quan-
dary. Something, after all, is both causing domestic uniformity, and
inhibiting global convergence.  Surely it has nothing to do with some
sort of interest in maximizing commercial and economic benefit, for if
uniformity maximizes economic benefit and facilitates trade, it would
do so as much across national borders as it would across state borders.
Rather, what is at work is the belief, the fundamentalist religious be-
lief, if I might describe it so, in adherence to the Code as a form of
quasi religious obedience that has inspired the success of the one, and
contributed to the failure of the other.
To demonstrate this, I will focus on two areas of attempted global
convergence.  These correspond to two of the more hallowed Articles
of the Code; namely, Article 2, which deals with the sale of goods,24
and Article 9, which deals with means to obtain security over debt.25
Admittedly, the particularities over the failure of global convergence
differ in the two contexts.  Article 9 lies in that area of commercial law
where all would agree that difficulty exists globally.  There is nothing
approaching agreement on a means by which debt may be secured on
an international scale.26  Broad transnational resistance has stymied
efforts to reach a comprehensive agreement based on the American
model.27  Meanwhile, in 2008, five justifiably well-regarded commer-
cial law professors participated on a panel during a “Conference on
Globalizing Secured Transaction Law.”  The panel was entitled, with-
out apparent irony, “Why Isn’t Everyone Adopting Revised Article 9,
UCC?  Should They?”28  Given the title of the conference, and the
24. U.C.C. art. 2 (1962).
25. U.C.C. art. 9 (2001).
26. Mark J. Sundahl, The “Cape Town Approach”: A New Method of Making International
Law, 44 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 339, 346–47 (2006).
27. See infra Part (II)(D).
28. Program – Conference on Globalizing Secured Transactions Law, Mar. 13-14, 2008,
THOMAS JEFFERSON SCH. OF LAW, http://students.tjsl.edu/files/academics/TJSL_Program_13-14_
Mar08_rev8.pdf (last visited Oct. 28, 2011).
\\jciprod01\productn\D\DPB\10-2\DPB203.txt unknown Seq: 8 26-JAN-12 9:49
308 DEPAUL BUSINESS & COMMERCIAL LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 10:301
fact that all fifty states had adopted Revised Article 9 by early 2002,29
the reference was obviously to foreign states simply accepting Ameri-
can text as superior to their own and therefore adopting it as such.  It is
quite reminiscent of the suggestions of prominent and important pro-
ponents of Islamic finance that somehow, had the world only adhered
to Islam’s commercial principles (perhaps by converting to Islam?),
the recent global financial crisis could have been averted.30  Neither
should be a surprise, it is the nature of the true believer to seek con-
version, not compromise.31  Still, had the Islamic Law Section of the
American Association of Law Schools titled its annual conference
“Why Isn’t Everyone Adopting Shari’a Law?  Should They?” I
surmise more eyebrows might have been raised.
The difficulties as they concern the sale of goods are in fact almost
as serious, though not as immediately apparent.  A large number of
nations have adopted the Convention on the International Sale of
Goods (CISG), which is intended to harmonize cross border sales of
goods.32  However, the track record of all too many United States
courts interpreting it is anything but encouraging.33  The type of disre-
gard and contempt many United States courts seem to have for the
CISG, reverting in many cases back to the Code, reminds one of the
29. See WILLIAM D. WARREN & STEVEN D. WALT, SECURED TRANSACTIONS IN PERSONAL
PROPERTY (8th ed. 2010).
30. See, e.g., P.K. Abdul Ghafour, Islamic Finance Panacea for Global Crisis: Chapra, ARAB
NEWS (Oct. 23, 2008), http://archive.arabnews.com/?page=6&section=0&article=115730&d=23&
m=10&y=2008 (interviewing well-known Islamic finance proponent Umer Chapra on the bene-
fits of an Islamic financial system).
31. I do not mean by this to make the simplistic and empirically falsifiable claim that it is
impossible for a believer to simultaneously adhere to religious doctrine and genuinely commit
herself to a political conception of justice that does not enforce it but rather treats other religions
with equal respect. I am perfectly happy to concede, indeed to forcefully argue, that the over-
whelming majority of committed believers, at least in the United States, and certainly the ones I
know within the Muslim community, find political allegiance to the liberal state and religious
adherence to religious law doctrine to be uncontroversial in precisely the manner that Rawls
anticipates. See JOHN RAWLS, POLITICAL LIBERALISM 169 (1993).  Yet it is one thing to speak of
religious communities tolerating inconsistent religious practices of others and cooperating with
others on matters of public concern (police forces, fire departments, school boards, and the like),
and quite another to ask a committed believer to compromise over the core tenets of her faith.
Applied to the question of commercial law, I would not suggest that American faith in Article 9
prevents cooperation, of the political or economic sort, with states that do not adhere to its
principles.  I do maintain that it prevents the creation of a comprehensive system of commercial
regulation that might be applied globally because it leaves the believer in Article 9 either agree-
ing to compromise over central rules contained in Article 9, or seeking to convert the globe to
Article 9.  When left with such a choice, the believer will always prefer conversion, not
compromise.
32. Albert H. Kritzer, CISG: Table of Contracting States, PACE L. SCH. INST. INT’L COM. L.,
http://www.cisg.law.pace.edu/cisg/countries/cntries.html (last updated Aug. 3, 2011).
33. See infra Part (IV)(A).
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means by which courts in developing nations refuse to abide by treaty
obligations regarding enforcement of arbitral awards, for example, be-
cause of their broad hostility to arbitral practice.34
The recalcitrance is remarkable, far greater than might be expected
even granting some allowance to domestic expressions of parochialism
in understanding international treaties.  Religion, again, offers the
most convenient explanation.  Rabbis asked to apply shari’a (or
imams asked to apply halakha), are similarly likely to fall back upon
their own religious tradition in relatively short order.  The alternative
forms of rules that would otherwise be applied are not only odd, they
are not only difficult to harmonize with the respective clergy mem-
ber’s own normative or ideological commitments, and they not only
require interpretive tools with which the relevant interpretive author-
ity might be unfamiliar, but they are also, at some level, false, in that
they derive from a religious tradition the clergy member does not be-
lieve in.  This type of near overt hostility, not merely unfamiliarity but
near contempt, is a fair description of the manner in which the U.S.
Circuit Courts have approached the CISG.  These courts do not so
much make a mess of it (perhaps a result to be expected whenever a
tribunal applies foreign law) as they openly and contemptuously re-
fuse to apply it, and simply use the U.C.C. rules in their place.
Thus, in both the cases of sales in goods and secured transactions,
this paper will demonstrate, there has been a considerable failure to
reach convergence and this failure may be attributed (at least in part,
at least insofar as blame may be attributed to the United States) on
the quasi religious faith the American commercial community contin-
ues to ascribe to the Code, and the failure of the faithful to imagine
alternative paradigms on which global convergence might be more re-
alistically achieved.  In short, what we expect, indeed what we de-
mand, from the world is adoption of the American faith, and as
everyone knows by now, universal conversion is hardly a basis upon
which to build common ground.
Part II of this paper describes the manner in which we commercial
lawyers adhere to the Code as if it were a Sacred Text, and the corre-
sponding commercial legal regulatory system as if it were a form of
quasi religious doctrine, offering in the process an analogy to Islamic
finance.  Part III explains the repercussions as they pertain to global
failure to reach any sort of convergence over the obtaining of security
for a loan, a major source of concern for commercial actors globally.
34. See, e.g., Chibli Mallat, Commercial Law in the Middle East: From Classical Transactions
and Modern Business, 48 AM. J. COMP. L. 81, 136–38 (2000).
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Part IV shows how, far from being a success, in fact the Convention
for the International Sale of Goods is plagued in the American do-
mestic context with a broad refusal of the American judiciary to inter-
pret it according to its own terms in a manner that harmonizes with
global expectations.  Instead, it falls back upon the Sacred Text, the
Code, wherever possible, at times under circumstances where to do so
is to ignore clear CISG directive.  This demonstrates a failure only
slightly less serious than that described over the matter of security
over debt.  Part V concludes with consideration of broader, future
repercussions of these processes.
II. IN THE BEGINNING WAS THE WORD
A. The Uniform Law Processes and the Code
It might be tempting to describe uniformity to the Code not as in-
dicative of adherence to Code as Sacred Text, but rather the rational
decisions of fifty independent jurisdictions35 to understand the value
of uniformity in a text they have rationally concluded is the best that
can be done.  Therefore, the states adhere therefore to the recommen-
dations of the drafters without revision.  This piecemeal and almost
haphazard approach might describe the results of the uniform law
processes more generally, beyond the Code, rather than the Code it-
self.  That is to say, state behavior in those contexts, precisely because
it is rational, trends towards some uniformity in some contexts, but is
far less coordinated.
The uniform laws project is jointly sponsored by the ALI and the
ULC.36  According to the ULC’s own statistics, nearly one hundred
and fifty uniform laws37 have been proposed.  Compiling a complete
and timely set of enactment levels for the many uniform laws from the
data provided by the ULC would be time consuming and largely be-
yond the purposes of this Article.  However, to provide a general
sense, Professors Ribstein and Kobayashi report, based on a compre-
hensive review, that as of 1996 (when the number of proposals stood
at 103) that fully sixty-two of them had less than twenty state adop-
35. While the UCC has been broadly adopted in all fifty states, Louisiana has not adopted
Articles 2 or 2A, finding them incompatible with its own civilian inspired system. BENFIELD &
GREENFIELD, supra note 13, at 5.
36. Edward J. Janger, Predicting when the Uniform Law Process will Fail: Article 9, Capture
and the Race to the Bottom, 83 IOWA L. REV. 569, 576 (1998).
37. Acts, UNIFORM L. COMMISSION, www.nccusl.org/Acts.aspx (last visited Oct. 28, 2011). In
fact, the number is greater than 150, depending on how one chooses to count the Code, as a
separate uniform law for each Article, as the website does, or as a single comprehensive uniform
commercial law.
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tions and thirty-seven had less than ten, hardly a stellar record.38  A
more recent commentator, less focused on this particular task, has
suggested in passing that half of the uniform law proposals have been
adopted by fewer than ten jurisdictions.39
Whatever the number, success plainly is rarely complete in the form
of universal adoption and varies from proposal to proposal.  Moreo-
ver, in many cases, the results of the uniform law process are not suc-
cess at all but rather abysmal failure.  To provide an example of
moderate success, nineteen states and the U.S. Virgin Islands have
adopted the Uniform Probate Code (UPC), according to the ULC.40
At the other end of the spectrum, the Uniform Computer and Infor-
mation Technology Act (UCITA)41 has been far less successful, re-
ceiving a worse reception in fact than if it had been entirely ignored by
every single jurisdiction.  The ULC reports two states having enacted
it.42 What the ULC does not mention is that four jurisdictions have
passed what are known as “bomb shelter” provisions that are meant
to shield UCITA from software users within the state by voiding
choice of law provisions that would make UCITA applicable.43  In
other words, not only have the vast majority of states declined to
adopt UCITA, but the number of states that have sought to actively
limit its scope to the fullest extent possible is double the number that
have adopted it.  A worse result for the uniform processes could
hardly be imagined.
Thus, it can be said at the very least that a decision by a state not to
enact a piece of uniform legislation proposed through the uniform
laws process is common.  This is in marked contrast to the Code, sug-
gesting that there is something qualitatively different about the Code,
something that transcends the general uniform law processes as dis-
cussed by other scholars, which deserves attention.44  The states do
38. Ribstein & Kobayashi, supra note 16, at 134–35.
39. Karen J. Sneddon, Beyond the Personal Representative: The Potential of Succession With-
out Administration, 50 S. TEX. L. REV. 449, 471 (2009) (dealing specifically with issues of probate
and the Uniform Probate Code and as such is less concerned with the uniform laws process
generally).
40. See Acts: Probate Code, UNIFORM  L. COMM’N, http://www.nccusl.org/Act.aspx?title=
probate%20Code (last visited Oct. 28, 2011).
41. UNIF. COMPUTER INFORMATION TRANSACTIONS ACT (2001), available at http://www.law.
upenn.edu/bll/archives/ulc/ucita/ucita200.htm.
42. See Acts: Computer Information Transaction Act, UNIF. LAW COMM’N, http://www.nccusl.
org/Act.aspx?title=computer%20Information%20Transactions%20Act (last visited Oct. 28,
2011).
43. IOWA CODE § 554D.125 (2010); N.C. GEN STAT. § 66-329 (2010); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 9,
§ 2463a (2010); W. VA. CODE § 55-8-15 (2010).
44. See generally, e.g., Ribstein & Kobayashi, supra note 16; Janger, supra note 36.
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not seem to feel as compelled to maintain uniformity in any other area
in a manner that even approaches remotely their rigid adherence to
the uniformity of the Code.
The Article 9 revisions of the Code in 2001 are perhaps most in-
structive.45  The Drafting Committee completed the revisions in 1999
with the understanding that they would go into effect on July 1, 2001
for those states in which they had been enacted.46  Forty-eight out of
fifty states enacted them by that date.47  By the end of that year, Arti-
cle 9 was effective law in all fifty states, the District of Columbia, and
the U.S. Virgin Islands.48  While it is true that no state has enacted the
revisions to Article 2 proposed in 2003,49 what is most interesting for
our purposes is the manner in which in either case, uniformity is main-
tained.  That is to say, revisions are proposed, and such revisions are
either effectively rejected or accepted by the states as if they were a
single constituent unit. The partial enactments that characterize nearly
every single other uniform law proposal are absent.
B. Nonuniformities and Heresies
1. The PEB and the Protection of the Faith
As with any religion, the U.C.C. did not develop much of its rigid
dogmatism until years after its initial promulgation.  During the initial
ten year period following Code promulgation, from 1952 to 1962, state
enactments proceeded in a generally uniform fashion.50   However,
this was also a period of frequent and fitful Code revision, enactment,
and moderate individual state-by-state nonuniform adjustment,51 dis-
cussed in more detail below.52  For now, it suffices to note that states
were behaving as rational actors in their adoptions, and in a manner
generally consistent with the way in which they respond to other pro-
posals emanating from the uniform laws processes.
45. The swiftness with which the Article 9 revisions took place also cast significant doubt on
any position that American adherence to the Code is due to some innate feature of legal conser-
vatism, where the United States’ reluctance to reach any sort of global convergence on matters
relating to security is simply due to the fact that the legal community has grown used to one
system, and does not wish to learn anything new and is therefore institutionally resistant to any
change that might be imposed on it.  Suffice it to say that given the nature of the rewriting, many
a commercial lawyer needed to learn a few new things upon the enactment of Revised Article 9.
46. WARREN & WALT, supra note 29, at 11.
47. Id.
48. Charles W. Mooney, Jr., Commercial Calamities: The Consumer Compromise in Revised
U.C.C. Article 9: The Shame of it All, 68 OH. ST. L.J. 215, 216 (2007).
49. See infra Part (II)(B)(3).
50. E. ALLAN FARNSWORTH, CONTRACTS § 1.9, at 31 (4th ed. 2004).
51. Id.
52. See Section II(B)(3) infra.
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Much has changed since that early period.  The sponsoring organi-
zations have proven themselves quite effective in limiting nonuniform
enactments to the Code.  This was achieved through the creation of
the Permanent Editorial Board (PEB) in 1961, whose primary tasks
were to preserve the sanctity of the urtext by “discouraging”
nonuniform amendments and recommending changes as necessary.53
Protection of the Word thus became paramount virtue, through as-
signing the PEB two functions.  The first of these was similar to the
function of office of the Inquisition within the Vatican (since renamed
the Congregation for the Doctrine of the Faith); namely, to “discour-
age” nonuniform amendments, or, as the Vatican would have it, to
“spread sound doctrine and defend those points of Christian tradition
which seem in danger because of new and unacceptable doctrines.”54
The second function was to recommend changes to the ALI and ULC
priesthood, presumably (given the first function) so as to enable,
among other things, the maintaining of strict uniformity and the elimi-
nation of heresies by keeping the Code current and to the satisfaction
of all.55
The institutionalization of Church dogma, and the consequent de-
nial of legitimacy to any deviation as heresy, was thus subsequent to
the initial creation of the Word, as it is within any religion.  A prophet
descends and with him comes the sacred Revelation.  Yet disputes
arise as to what that Revelation is, what it means, and divergent un-
derstandings begin to abound.  In early Islamic history, for example,
disputes arise as to the proper sources of law.  One faction, the
Mu’tazila, demand a prominent place for reason while others, led by
the early jurist Shafi’i, emphasize the role of prophetic statements and
utterances.  Precisely what those utterances are become the subject of
debate within the scholarly community as well, given the obvious
temptation to fabricate to advance a material position. Nonuniformi-
ties, that is to say, proliferated as to the proper foundational material
that may be deemed sacred and foundational. Eventually, within Sunni
Islam, the matter is institutionalized into the four accepted schools of
jurisprudence, what the Prophet said is canonized into sets of sacred
53. Current Projects: Permanent Editorial Board for the UCC, AM. L. INST., http://www.ali.org/
index.cfm?fuseaction=projects.proj_ip&projectid=4 (last visited Oct. 28, 2011) [hereinafter
About the PEB].
54. See Congregation for the Doctrine of the Faith, VATICAN, http://www.vatican.va/roman_
curia/congregations/cfaith/documents/rc_con_cfaith_pro_14071997_en.html (last visited Nov. 20,
2011).
55. See infra Part (II)(B)(3) (addressing the (false) notion that by changing the Code to keep
it current, the drafters are not engaged in a religious exercise because religious doctrine never
changes).
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text, and deviations dismissed as heresy or worse, apostasy.  The Word
(and the institutions charged with its protection) thus remain cohe-
sive, and adherence to them becomes Divine Command, where it was
not decades earlier.  A similar tale might be told of the vigorous dis-
agreements in the early Catholic Church and the eventual canoniza-
tion of the books of the New Testament.  So it was with the
canonization of the urtext and the concomitant rise of the PEB to pro-
tect it.
Churches of this sort rarely need to exercise direct state control to
exercise their power so long as the relevant community has accepted
both the religion as reflecting Divine Command, as well as the role of
the church in defining that Divine Command.  Thus, the connection of
the PEB to any actual elected sovereign is attenuated.  It is a joint
committee of the ALI and the ULC.  The ALI is an entirely private
organization whose purpose, according to its own website, is to
“produc[e] scholarly work to clarify, modernize, and otherwise im-
prove the law.”56  The ULC is composed of representatives of the
states, the District of Columbia, Puerto Rico and the U.S. Virgin Is-
lands.57  These sovereigns fund it, though obviously its rulings would
not be binding on any one of them.58
Thus, the high priests of the PEB retain no legal power over the
sovereign states.  Nevertheless, they are tasked by the High Church of
the Code, the ALI, and the ULC, to ensure uniformity and they have
as a result of this power, along with the broad religious faith of the
commercial community in the Code, managed to achieve remarkable
cohesion over the sanctity of the Word.  Thus, it is precisely the relig-
ious power of the PEB as Church that enables it to exercise its “dis-
couragement” function so well.  If, again, we were to assume that the
uniformity in text was merely product of rational decision making on a
state-by-state basis, then the PEB’s powers would be dramatically cir-
cumscribed.  It would offer its rationally derived opinion, and one
would expect that often enough a sovereign vested with actual legisla-
tive power would ignore it, for its own rational, or at least self-inter-
ested, reasons.  It is religion, fundamentalist faith in the PEB and the
institutions that created it, that confer upon it a majesty that any
group of academics would almost never otherwise have in the halls of
a state legislature.
56. About ALI, AM. L. INST., http://www.ali.org/index.cfm?fuseaction=about.overview (last
visited Oct. 28, 2011).
57. About ULC, UNIF. L. COMMISSION, http://www.nccusl.org/Narrative.aspx?title=about%
20the%20ULC  (last visited Oct. 28, 2011).
58. BENFIELD & GREENFIELD, supra note 13, at 3.
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This power alone can be grounds for concern.  Professors Ribstein
and Kobayashi have studied the matter of adherence to uniform laws
in economic terms, and have concluded that, though states generally
adopt more efficient proposals and not less efficient ones, still states at
times adopt uniform law proposals at the insistence of the Code’s con-
stituent organizations even when the results do not seem to lead to
efficient outcomes.59  Such examples would include situations where
state experimentation might produce more possible beneficial solu-
tions than any single rule maker could.60
Ribstein and Kobayashi focus on the enactment of an entire uni-
form proposal, pointing out that they are not dealing with
nonuniformities within the enactment itself.61  However, the issues
they raise are even more pertinent in the context of potential
nonuniform enactments to the Code.  In those contexts, it is quite pos-
sible that a state’s consideration of nonuniform amendment is driven
precisely by its own particular needs, and to fail to enact them out of
misplaced deference to the PEB’s command as High Church leads to
less efficient and less beneficial results.  The religious fervor attached
to the Code’s urtext as Holy Text and the rejection of nonuniformity
as heresy despite potential advantages to an individualized approach
is perhaps best provided by way of a recent, important, representa-
tive62 example provided in the next section.
2. Article 9 and the Name
To offer background, the purpose of Article 9, or any analogous
regime respecting security for debt, is to offer secured creditors a
means to have what is owed to them repaid from particular, specified
secured property before other creditors may satisfy the debts owed
them from the assets of an insolvent debtor’s estate generally.63  Thus,
to take the most common example of a secured transaction, a bank
which has previously given a properly secured mortgage to an insol-
vent homeowner has, in bankruptcy, priority as concerns sale of that
59. Ribstein & Kobayashi, supra note 16, at 132.
60. Id. at 140–41.
61. Id. at 156–57.
62. See infra Part (II)(B)(2).  My example, in the following subsection, respecting an issue of
nonuniformity as concerns Article 9, might be deemed selective, in that deviations from text as
they concern Article 9 seem to result in an even more vociferous response than deviations in
Article 2.  This may be true, though it would take more than a footnote to explore it.  It suffices
to say, however, that in both cases, even if the reaction differs as to extent, the discouragement
function of the PEB is significant enough to limit significantly nonuniform enactment across the
entire Code, as I describe below.
63. See JAMES J. WHITE & ROBERT S. SUMMERS, UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE 1150–51
(Thomson Reuters, 6th ed. 2010) (describing process in the context of the Code).
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property against all other creditors of that same debtor who have no
security in the property, for example, credit card companies.  The so-
called unsecured creditors must be satisfied with dividing whatever
proceeds remain from the sale of the secured asset after the secured
creditor has been paid and whatever other secured assets the creditor
might have.
In order to work, the system requires a notice filing and some sort
of public recording system so that existing and potential creditors are
on constructive notice respecting existing security obligations over the
debtor’s property.64  Under the Code, the notice filing undertaken by
a creditor is known a financing statement, with the process of comple-
tion of the filing known as “perfection” of the security interest.65
Section 9-503(a) of the Code provides rules respecting the type of
identifying information that must appear on a creditor’s financing
statement respecting the name of a debtor before the property of that
debtor can be secured.66  For an individual, subsection 4 indicates that
the statement is “only” sufficient if it “provides the individual . . .
name of the debtor.”67  A problem potentially arises as to what pre-
cisely an “individual name” is.  Suppose, to take an entirely hypotheti-
cal example, that the person’s name on her driver’s license appears as
“Jessie Allen.”  Would a financing statement with the name “Jessie
Allen” suffice?  Should a creditor ask for a birth certificate to see if
the original name might be “Jessica” rather than “Jessie” because the
name appears as if it might be a diminutive?  If so, should they also
verify there have been no name changes made in court since then?
How much of this is really necessary for a creditor to undertake
before offering a loan?  The urtext, by saying nothing more than “indi-
vidual name,” is plainly ambiguous on the point and therefore pa-
tently unhelpful.  To deal with this problem, several states adopted
additional language creating a “safe harbor” indicating that the fi-
nancing statement is per se effective respecting name if it includes the
name of the individual as printed on her valid driver’s license.68  One
state went somewhat further, permitting a financing statement if it
could be found via a future creditor’s search of last names.69
64. Id.
65. Id.
66. U.C.C. § 9-503(a) (2011).
67. Id. § 9-503(a)(4)(A).
68. Compare Tenn. Code Ann. § 47-9-503(a)(4) (2010); TEX. Bus. & Com. Code Ann.
§ 9.503(a)(4) (West 2002); Va. Code Ann. § 8.9A-503(a)(4) (2010) (granting a safe harbor) with
U.C.C. § 9-503(a)(4)(2011) (requiring individuals to include the “individual name” of the debtor,
without defining how to determine it).
69. NEB. REV. STAT. § 9-506(c) (2009) repealed by 2010 Neb. Laws 751.
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To the uninitiated, this seems rather harmless.  I would describe it
as salutary.  At worst, the desire of a state to create a “safe harbor”
for a financing statement by permitting reliance on a driver’s license
seems a rather pedestrian exercise of state sovereignty on a point of
exceedingly minor concern.  At best, this could be defended as an ex-
cellent example of federalism at work, an application of Brandeis’
“state as laboratory” metaphor,70 or the type of circumstances where
Professors Ribstein and Kobayashi might indicate state competition is
preferable to uniformity.71  If greater clarity is achieved through the
nonuniform enactment, we will have learned something.  If not —if, as
in Nebraska, there might be concern that merely the last name puts
far too great a burden on those searching because of the large number
of entries that might be found for common last names such as “Smith”
or “Jones”— then this would be of some use to other states as well.  In
any event, state uniformity is hard to imagine even if no state under-
took a uniform enactment.  The urtext is so fundamentally ambiguous
that there is little chance that there would be any uniformity in judicial
application.  Indeed, evidence suggests that courts have not been at all
helpful in clarifying the meaning of the term “individual name” when
applying § 9-503(a)(4).72  Where courts and the urtext have failed, the
nonuniform enactment would, by contrast, provide precisely the type
of clarity and simplicity, practicality and modernism, that the Code is
supposed to provide, and, in this case, utterly fails to provide.
Instead of welcoming such limited and potentially helpful
nonuniformity, however, something approaching apoplexy ensued in
light of the rising heresy among the nonuniform states.  This rather
minor matter has been deemed, ominously, to mark the “end of uni-
formity.”73  With only nine years since its last effective enactment to
Article 9, hardly much time for the Code in revised form to have per-
colated, this lack of uniformity is understood to have all but forced
near immediate action through the enactment by the High Church of
yet another set of amendments, precisely to rectify this problem and
ensure uniformity to the Word.74  Ironically, for the priesthood of uni-
70. New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J. dissenting).
71.  Ribstein & Kobayashi, supra note 16, at 140.
72. Kevin V. Tu, The Rise of State-Specific Attempts to Decipher the Sufficiency-of-a-Debtor-
Name Standard Under Revised Article 9 and the End of Uniformity in Secured Transactions, 59
U. KAN. L. REV. 85, 96 (2010). See also Edwin E. Smith, A Summary of the 2010 Amendments to
Article 9 of the Uniform Commercial Code, in SECURED TRANSACTIONS 2011: WHAT LAWYERS
NEED TO KNOW ABOUT UCC ARTICLE 9, at 363, 369 (PLI Commercial Law & Practice, Course
Handbook Ser. No. 932, 2011), available at Westlaw 932 PLI/Comm 363 (describing this lack of
uniformity as necessitating amendments to Revised Article 9).
73. Tu, supra note 72, at 96.
74. Smith, supra note 72, at 369–70.
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formity, which forced this change because of deviations from the
Code, the proposal they ended up with was itself not uniform. Instead
it involved two alternatives, one of which made reliance on the
driver’s license all but mandatory, and the other which permitted it as
a safe harbor, as three of the four original apostates from the urtext
had suggested.75  There is an irony to this—nonuniformity to the
urtext was deemed a reason to force early amendments, and yet, the
urtext is in the proposed revisions itself nonuniform.
In other words, the difficulty with the nonuniform enactments, “dis-
couraged” by the protectors of the doctrine, the PEB, was not their
actual content, nor even the fact that they might result in a different
outcome in different states, as the revisions contemplate something
similar.  It was, rather, that they were a heresy. They deviated in a
fashion that the doctrine did not sanction, and that the high priests who
control the Holy Text did not approve. It is hard to describe as ra-
tional a reaction to a deviation from Code as necessitating a set of
amendments which themselves do not achieve uniformity.  It is a far
more satisfying analogy to imagine such reactions for what they
were—precisely the rejection that the believer would have when Sa-
cred Text is tampered with by those other than the institutions which
have been given the authority to protect it and determine its true
content.76
As for the fourth apostate, Nebraska, this amendment if enacted
would make it something of an outlier, a continued dissenter from the
demands of the Church in its insistence on reliance on a last name
alone.  But such apostasy does not often last long so long as a religious
hierarchy is powerful enough, and this hierarchy is among the mighti-
est around.  Before the proposed amendments were even complete,
only one week and one year after they had even been made, Nebraska
had repealed its nonuniform amendment.77  Declaring the law “imme-
75. Id. at 375.  The matter is more complicated than described in the text, though not in a
manner relevant to this Article.  For example, a debtor might not have a driver’s license, or she
might have two.  The revisions address both possibilities.  For the exact details, none of which
are relevant to this Article, see id.
76. In this way, the matter is somewhat different from a more philosophical quandary de-
scribed in a scintillating piece by Perry Dane, of why a state which believed that its laws were in
conformity with natural law would ever apply foreign law.  Perry Dane, The Natural Law Chal-
lenge to Choice of Law in THE ROLE OF ETHICS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW (Donald Earl Childress
III ed., 2010), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/abstract_id=1710904.  The issue in that example
was an exclusivist certainty that the content of the laws in question were normatively superior to
any other possible legal formulations.  The issue here is more of an attachment not only to the
law itself, in other words not merely to its values, but also to the institutions meant to protect it—
a religious-like faith, that is, in both the Word and the Church.
77. 2010 Neb. Laws 751.
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diately effective” because of an “emergency,” the state brought itself
safely back into the fold.78  Only Holy Roman Emperor Henry IV,
barefoot at Canossa before Pope Gregory VII, sought repentance
more urgently than this, for disobedience of far greater magnitude.79
If the amendments are enacted (a matter on which there is no guaran-
tee, of course),80 then the Word will be restored among all states.
Admittedly, this is not the only example of nonuniform enactment.
To take another example, some states in adopting the 2001 revisions
to Article 1 have refused to include a revised definition of good faith
that includes an objective component.81  One may safely say, however,
that given the hyperbole that has arisen in the Article 9 “individual
name” context, such nonuniformity is rare.  It is frowned upon by the
protectors of the doctrine, the PEB, whose function it is to “discour-
age” such appalling exercises of state sovereignty,82 which it has done
quite effectively.  The control of the High Church over ensuring uni-
formity to the urtext is so thorough that a justifiably highly respected
member of prior Code Drafting Committees, Neil Cohen, felt under-
standably compelled, when explaining compromises made to interest
groups in the drafting process, to state something which should have
been obvious to anyone who had completed sixth grade civics—the
urtext only becomes law when legislatures enact it.83
The irony is delicious.  Had the Church been the elected federal gov-
ernment, another sovereign, it could never have exerted comparable
levels of control.  The anti-commandeering principles specifically limit
the federal government’s abilities to control state legislative enact-
78. Id.
79. Reportedly, Holy Roman Emperor Henry IV on his own and through bishops he had
appointed had sought to force Pope Gregory VII to step down from his position. H.E.J. COW-
DREY, POPE GREGORY VII 138 (1998).  In response, Gregory VII excommunicated Henry IV
and forbade anyone to serve him as king. Id. at 140–41.  After it was clear that Henry IV would
not succeed in his efforts, he was forced to seek repentance, walking barefoot in the snow to
where the Pope was staying, in Canossa, and remain outside for three days begging for forgive-
ness before the interdiction was lifted. Id. at 155–57.  As a condition of his absolution, Henry IV
was required to “within the limit of time that the Lord Pope Gregory shall appoint, do . . .
whatever is right according to his judgment.” Id. at 157. See also Steven D. Smith, Discourse in
the Dusk: The Twilight of Religious Freedom?, 122 HARV. L. REV. 1869 (2009) (reviewing KENT
GREENAWALT, RELIGION AND THE CONSTITUTION – VOLUME 2: ESTABLISHMENT AND FAIRNESS
(2008)).
80. See infra Part (II)(B) (respecting the increasing difficulty of amending the Code).
81. BENFIELD & GREENFIELD, supra note 13, at 171.
82. About the PEB, supra note 53.
83. Neil B. Cohen, Taking Democracy Seriously, 52 HASTINGS L.J. 667, 668 (2001) (addressing
the question of Revised Article 2 and the ability of the PEB to force broad revisions to the Code
onto the states).
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ment, even as to matters over which Congress has jurisdiction.84  Be-
cause, as Cohen notes, the PEB is not a sovereign, because in fact it is
an organization of high priests unconnected to any legal authority, the
matter is different.  They may not be able to legally “commandeer”
anything, any more than the refusal of an orthodox Jewish husband to
deliver a “get” to his wife prevents his wife from legally obtaining a
civil divorce on whatever grounds are available in the relevant state’s
law.85  But to be an outcast, whether it be the state of Nebraska as
concerns adherence to the Code, or the agunah as it concerns the dic-
tates of orthodox Judaism, is deterrent enough within the community
of the believers.86
3. Revisions to the Word
It might be appropriate to address here a preliminary objection,
easily dispensed with, which is that a Holy Text does not change while
the Code does, and with some frequency.  Of this, two things might be
said.  First of all, the supposed distinction may be overstated.  As was
alluded to in the previous subsection, Holy Texts often change in early
periods, and only after the passage of much time become largely
unamendable.  The books of the New Testament were canonized hun-
dreds of years after the death of Jesus after much debate over their
proper content.87  The main corpus of legal rules within Islamic Law,
the compilation of utterances and actions of the Prophet Muhammad
commonly referred to as the Sunna, were similarly canonized hun-
dreds of years after the Prophet’s death.88  A message is delivered,
84. See New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 166 (1992) (“The allocation of power con-
tained in the Commerce Clause . . . authorizes Congress to regulate interstate commerce di-
rectly; it does not authorize Congress to regulate state governments’ regulation of interstate
commerce.”).
85. See RAN HIRSCHL, CONSTITUTIONAL THEOCRACY 201 (2010) (describing precisely such an
issue as it arose in Canada in a case that reached the Canadian Supreme Court).  Jewish law
traditionally requires the delivery by the husband to the wife of what is known as the “get” in
order for a woman to be legally divorced from her husband. Id. at 201. Absent this, the woman
is known as an “agunah” and remains unable to marry within the faith community. Id. at 201.
The issue was significant enough to result in the passage of two laws in New York that have the
effect of requiring delivery of the get in order for a man to obtain a divorce and that permit
consideration of whether or not the get has been granted when distributing property as between
a divorcing couple. See Kent Greenawalt, Religious Law and Civil Law: Using Secular Law to
Assure Observance of Practices with Religious Significance, 71 S. CAL. L. REV. 781, 823–35
(1998) (arguing that these laws are unconstitutional).
86. Greenawalt, supra note 85, at 782. (“For some Jewish women, obtaining a get is vital to
their prospects for a fulfilling life after civil divorce.”).
87. BRUCE M. METZGER, THE CANON OF THE NEW TESTAMENT: ITS ORIGIN, DEVELOPMENT,
AND SIGNIFICANCE (1987).
88. Chibli Mallat, From Islamic to Middle Eastern Law a Restatement of the Field (Part I), 51
AM. J. COMP. L. 699, 723–25 (2003)
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conflicting ideas about what it means begin to permeate, and at some
point, a particular set of texts is formally sanctified as the Word; its
alternatives thereby dismissed as heresy, or at least fabrication.89
Similarly, the UCC saw intense revision in its earliest period.  In
1952, an Official Draft was promulgated and adopted in 1953 by Penn-
sylvania.90  Revisions were made, and a 1957 Official Draft promul-
gated, adopted by Massachusetts and Kentucky.91  A further set of
amendments led to a 1958 Official Text, adopted by Connecticut and
New Hampshire.92  Less than a decade after its enactment, the Uni-
form Commercial Code already had three versions, each of them in
effect in different states.  Adding further complication was the spread
of heresies, through nonuniform enactment, by various states.93  It was
precisely the spread of these heresies that led to a means of canoniza-
tion through the establishment of the office of the Protection of the
Faith, the PEB.  Canonization soon followed.  A single, uniform 1962
Official Version was then created, and enacted in all jurisdictions in its
entirety except for Louisiana, which has not enacted Articles 2 or
2A.94  Alternate versions may not have been actively sought out and
destroyed, as was the case with competing versions of the Qur’an in
early Islamic history,95 such versions are nonetheless safely consigned
to history’s proverbial dustbin.
Importantly, as concerns Article 2, respecting the sale of goods, that
all-important section with which first year law students are intimately
familiar, there has yet to be another revision put into effect in the
states.96  This is despite the fact that no less an authority than Nord-
strom indicated in his Contracts hornbook in 1970, only eight years
after the promulgation of the Official Text, that Article 2 required
89. In the case of the Prophetic Sunna, the quasi science of hadith reporting resulted in the
broad dismissal of large amounts of the Sunna as being of weak provenance.  Haider Ala
Hamoudi, Muhammad’s Social Justice or Muslim Cant?: Langdellianism and the Failures of Is-
lamic Finance, 40 CORNELL INT’L L.J. 89, 104–05 (2007).  Similarly, canonization in the Christian
tradition expelled competing versions of the Gospel from the New Testament. METZGER, supra
note 87.
90. Charles W. Mooney, Jr., Introduction to the Uniform Commercial Code Annual Survey:
Some Observations on the Past, Present, and Future of the U.C.C., 41 BUS. LAW. 1343, 1345
(1986).
91. Id.
92. Id.
93. FARNSWORTH, supra note 50, § 1.9, at 33.
94. BENFIELD & GREENFIELD, supra note 13, at 5.
95. Bernard K. Freamon, Slavery, Freedom and the Doctrine of Consensus in Islamic Jurispru-
dence, 11 HARV. HUM. RTS. J. 1, 14 n.48 (1998).
96. BAIRD ET AL., supra note 5.
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amendment.97  Yet it is not so easy to revise a canonized Holy Text.
There was an effort led by the PEB in 1987 to seek amendments to
Article 2, and to work with the ALI on developing one through a
Drafting Committee.98  It resulted in a completely revised version of
Article 2 being approved by the ALI.99  However, it was never ap-
proved by the ULC, and thus it never reached the states.100  The ALI,
PEB and ULC decided to try again, with something far less ambi-
tious.101  If the urtext could not be rewritten entirely, they reasoned,
perhaps it could be amended modestly.  Yet even this proved to be
impossible.  The ALI and the ULC approved a series of amendments
in 2003, and now, eight years after the fact, not a single state has en-
acted them.102
This should not be a surprise.  A Church may readily be able to
declare heretics and apostates on the basis of an existing Text, but
once achieved, it is all the harder to credibly change the Text exten-
sively.  Similarly, it seems as if the PEB has been perhaps so good at
the first part of its job, the Inquisition function of discouraging
nonuniformity, that its ability to do the second part, recommend
amendments, is severely compromised in effect.103  It has preserved
the sanctity of the Word to such an extent that states find themselves
remarkably reluctant to alter it even when the protectors of the
dogma themselves recommend it.  Indeed, while Article 2 is the
starkest example of this, leading commercial lawyers indicate that the
process of revision and enactment is becoming increasingly difficult
over the Code as a whole.104  This is precisely as might be expected for
a text, drafted and amended nearly annually during the first decade of
its life, subsequently achieving canonical status.  Opposition to Re-
vised Article 2 has come from industry and consumers and is phrased
in delightfully dystopian terms.  To adopt Miller’s phrasing, “to hear
the criticism from those who purport to speak for both consumers and
industry, one would think that Western civilization will end if
amended Article 2 becomes law.”105
97. Fred H. Miller, Uniform Commercial Code Article 2 on Sales of Goods and the Uniform
Law Process: A True Story of Good v.?, 11 DUQ. BUS. L.J. 143 (2009).
98. ROBERT J. NORDSTROM, LAW OF SALES §§ 2–3 (1970).
99. Miller, supra note 97, at 155.
100. Id.
101. Id.
102. BAIRD ET AL., supra note 5.
103. About the PEB, supra note 53 (describing dual function of PEB).
104. BAIRD ET AL., supra note 5.
105. Miller, supra note 97, at 165.
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This broad rejection from different interest groups, and the nature
of the objection (presaging something disastrous) dispenses easily
with any argument that the reason for the failure to amend has some-
thing to do with increased partisanship and interest group politics in
our times.  Nevertheless, even if partisanship were at play, such
protestations would be odd, as they would seem to presuppose an era
of initial Code drafting where partisanship and interest group politics
were absent, or at least reduced.  While this is precisely the manner in
which the faithful often seem to describe their legends, rarely is the
conception historically accurate.  Whether Constitution or Qur’an,
empirically disprovable mythologies develop respecting the political
conditions of the origin of canonical texts that resemble Eden before
the Fall—harmonious, generous and focused on the public interest—
as opposed to what are commonly depicted as our rancorous, partisan
and self-serving times.106
This is no less so as concerns the origins of the Code.  In fact, the
Code’s drafters included many political compromises into the Code in
order to satisfy political interests whose support was needed for pas-
sage, as much scholarly work demonstrates.  Robert Scott has shown
the extent to which banking interests influenced the drafting of Arti-
cle 9,107 a point also emphasized in the work of Kathleen Patchel con-
cerning Articles 3 and 4,108 and Edward Rubin regarding the revisions
to those Articles.109  In a very thoughtful, well reasoned and provoca-
tive Article, Professor Janger effectively ties together some of these
trends to identify where uniform law processes might fail because of
“anticipated capture”.  This refers to the process by which the relevant
drafting committee is so concerned about ultimate enactment that it
106. Just by way of example, what we know of early Islamic history following the Prophet’s
death is bloody, characterized by recourse to frequent internecine combat, including a large
battle between the Prophet’s son in law Ali b. Abi Talib and the Prophet’s wife A’isha, occurring
less than three decades after the death of the Prophet. FATIMA MERNISSI, THE VEIL AND THE
MALE ELITE: A FEMINIST INTERPRETATION OF WOMEN’S RIGHTS IN ISLAM 49–50 (1992).  Yet
though this history is broadly, if reluctantly, acknowledged, one can hardly find a basic text on
Islam that does not lionize the entire generation of the Prophet’s Companions, without noting the
obvious inconsistencies that arise by virtue of the internal conflicts. See, e.g., ANNEMARIE
SCHIMMEL, ISLAM: AN INTRODUCTION (1992).
107. Robert E. Scott, The Politics of Article 9, 80 VA. L. REV. 1783 (1994).
108. Kathleen Patchel, Interest Group Politics, Federalism, and the Uniform Laws Process:
Some Lessons from the Uniform Commercial Code, 78 MINN L. REV. 83, 98–102 (1993).
109. See Edward L. Rubin, Thinking like a Lawyer, Acting like a Lobbyist: Some Notes on
Revising UCC Articles 3 and 4, 26 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 743, 744–57 (1993), available at http://
digitalcommons.lmu.edu/llr/vol26/iss3/18. See also Homer Kripke, The Principles Underlying the
Drafting of the Uniform Commercial Code, 1962 U. ILL. L.F. 321, 327 (1962) (“Not only were
conservative tendencies present during the drafting; they were visible on the horizon at the legis-
lative stage.”).
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makes compromises to interest groups, not because of any actual pres-
sure put upon it by such groups, but because it anticipates such pres-
sure at the time of state-by-state enactment.110
This is to say nothing of the dramatic opposition to the Code even
in the compromised, interest laden form in which it appeared.111  The
stridency of some of the descriptions of the Code (“paternalist,” “left-
ist,” “social legislation”—a term which in today’s parlance might be
translated into “socialist”), resemble those which Fox News commen-
tators might say of any number of Democratic proposals through his-
tory, from the New Deal through the Great Society to President
Obama’s health care overhaul.112  The Association of the Bar of the
City of New York objected to the “new social tendencies” supposedly
apparent in the Code, among them unconscionability.113  Moreover, as
has been noted, partly at the urging of the City’s Bar Association, the
New York Law Review Commission seriously criticized the 1951 draft,
leading to the failure of any state to enact it other than Pennsylvania
until 1957.114  It also led to its substantial revision, recorded today in a
leading hornbook in rather neutral terms, thereby suggesting New
York was merely providing helpful suggestions on technical improve-
ment.115  In historical context, the second effort was obviously an at-
tempt to mollify the opposition to its supposed leftism by rendering it
more favorable to business groups and, even more importantly, large
banks.116
Thus, the National Association of Manufacturers may well have
helped derail the first attempted revision of Article 2,117 but this
hardly means that interest group influence had nothing to do with the
manner in which the Code was first developed.  It is difficult to read
accounts of the initial period and come to the conclusion that interests
were less divided than they are now.  What was different was not the
existence of partisanship and rancor, but the rather the fact that the
Code had not yet been drafted and thus had not had the opportunity
to reach the canonical status that it has now.  It is much easier to de-
fend that which has become sacred, to describe its amendment, even if
110. Janger, supra note 36, at 578–80.
111. See, e.g., Frederick K. Beutel, The Proposed Uniform [?] Commercial Code Should not
be Adopted, 61 YALE L.J. 334 (1952).
112. See Allen R. Kamp, Downtown Code: A History of the Uniform Commercial Code 1949-
1954, 49 BUFF. L. REV. 359, 395 (2001).
113. Id. at 466–67.
114. Id. at 468; Patchel, supra note 108, at 106.
115. FARNSWORTH, supra note 50, § 1.9, at 41 (describing revisions in neutral terms).
116. Kamp, supra note 112, at 469–70 (describing historical processes); Patchel, supra note
108, at 106 (describing bank influence in forcing New York’s revisions).
117. Miller, supra note 97, at 151.
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undertaken on moderate and sensible bases, as “the end of Western
civilization,” than it is to oppose the adoption of a new statute to deal
with modes of commerce that are not governed by any similar holy
text.  Strong opposition and partisan objection will exist in any era.
However, the sturdier the roots and the deeper the public attachment,
the more likely that partisan efforts on the part of any particular inter-
est group to oppose proposed revisions will be successful, because that
group will be able to point to the sanctity of the Holy Text as a reason
to retain it.   I do not mean by this to suggest that there will be no
future amendments, or to discount the substantial post-1962 amend-
ments made to much of the Code, including the 2001 Article 9 revi-
sions. The  only  point is that in fact, the dichotomy between the
supposedly unamendable Holy Book and freely amendable Code is
not as stark as it might at first blush appear to be.
The second, and perhaps more important, reason that equivalence
of Word and Code is appropriate stems from the fact that the Code
need not be equivalent to some form of inspired direct Revelation
from God in order to be something akin to sacred text.  That is to say,
once one agrees to expand the definition of sacred text beyond merely
the strict substance of Revelation (whether Bible, Qur’an, Torah or
other Holy Book) to include the corpus of doctrinal rules, the objec-
tion that the Code is not sacred because it is freely amendable is effec-
tively defeated.  To go no further than the Catholic Church, it is
church doctrine and not Holy Book that imposes the requirement of
unmarried priests even as it was church doctrine that required the lit-
urgy to be in Latin.118  One of these rules has been amended, the
other has not.119  Yet each is, during the period of its effect, in its way,
the Word.  To deviate is to sin, and potentially to lose one’s position
within the Church, indeed even potentially to lose one’s status as a
member of the Church.120  The Church controls the substance of the
Word, and the Congregation of the Doctrine of the Faith (the former
office of Inquisition) protects the entire substance of that doctrine from
deviancies and heresies—121 “discourages,” as it were, nonuniform de-
cisions with respect to it.  That the doctrine has changed and is capa-
118. 1917 CODE c. 928, translated in EDWARD N. PETERS, THE 1917 OR PIO-BENEDICTINE
CODE OF CANON LAW, 324–25 (2001); 1983 CODE c.1037, available at  http://www.vatican.va/
archive/ENG1104/__P3R.HTM.
119. SACROSANCTUM CONCILIUM [CONSTITUTION] Dec, 4, 1963, no. 36 § 2 (Vatican), available
at http://www.vatican.va/archive/hist_councils/ii_vatican_council/documents/vat-ii_const_
19631204_sacrosanctum-concilium_en.html.
120. 1917 CODE c.1321–30 translated in EDWARD N. PETERS, THE 1917 OR PIO-BENEDICTINE
CODE OF CANON LAW, 445–48 (2001).
121. See About the PEB, supra note 53.
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ble of changing in the future alters nothing with respect to these
conclusions.
Shi’i Islam, for its part, much like the PEB, explicitly anticipates
changes in religious doctrine, studiously recorded in the lengthy
manuals of the senior jurists, by vesting in the senior jurists the ability
to develop new rules, and to re-interpret old ones, without reference
to prior determinations, a power known as ijtihad.122  This ability to
amend does not divest the rules so derived of religious significance—
the layperson remains bound by them as much as if they were not
changed, it merely vests in the clergy the ability to make such
changes.123  So it is with the Code, whose clergy happen to be law
professors and judges rather than clerics and jurists.  This is not meant
to derogate from my earlier conclusion that change occurs more delib-
erately as matters become canonized—it is hard to imagine a Church
engaged in Vatican II like reforms on an annual basis being able to
survive—but it does mean that the mere fact of alteration does not
render core doctrine reflected in sacred text as being somehow less
than religious.
C. Islamic Finance and the Code
Analogies to other forms of modern commercial and legal practice
as a form of religious doctrine are difficult to come by.  In an intrigu-
ing article, Fletcher describes the United States Constitution, the
French Code Civil, and the German Bu¨rgerlischesgetzbuch (BGB) as
being “nearly sacred books in Western law.”124  Fletcher has many in-
teresting things to say about such matters, including the fact that the
“nearly sacred” status afforded to the Code Civil in France and the
BGB in Germany are not lessened by virtue of their frequent amend-
ment, much as I have said is the case with the Code.125  He also points
out that the clarity and predictability of the Code Civil and BGB are
largely a mirage, though his examples (tort, and general principles of
contract) are less relevant in the core areas of commerce that are the
subject of the UCC and, derivatively, this Article.126  Professor
Hirschl likewise devotes an important section of his latest work to the
manner in which constitutional law and religious law are far closer
122. CHIBLI MALLAT, THE RENEWAL OF ISLAMIC LAW 31 (1993).
123. Haider Ala Hamoudi, You Say You Want a Revolution: Interpretive Communities and the
Origins of Islamic Finance, 48 VA. J. INT’L L. 249, 268 (2008).
124. Fletcher, supra note 1.
125. Id. at 12.
126. Id. at 11.
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than is frequently assumed.127  Each has its sacred texts, its institutions
designed to protect them, its competition as between interpretation
and amendment, and its disputes over “originalist” and “purposivist”
methodological approaches, to name some of the major similarities
described.128  While the role of hierarchies in preserving the doctrine
is intriguing, the areas of law specifically discussed by Hirschl are less
relevant for the purposes of this Article.  Finally, in discussing the role
of faith in the context of understanding the constitution, Professor
Levinson’s excellent work on this subject and the rise of the “Ameri-
can civil religion” are deeply influential as a means to understand
American attachment to its own unique forms of political
governance.129
Thus, the comparison of constitutionalism to religious doctrine ap-
pears to be an attractive one to prominent scholars.  Unfortunately,
however, other scholars have not carried such ideas forward in the
area of commerce.  Yet as we have seen, it is difficult to justify or
explain the near pathological aversion to nonuniform enactment, the
rising inability to amend the Code, and the dramatic effectiveness of
the PEB in its “discouraging” function despite the absence of recourse
to legal sanction without some form of reverence to the urtext that
resembles the adherence of the pious to Divine Commandment.
Islamic finance offers the most attractive analogy in its ability to
develop a broadly convergent commercial practice on the basis of re-
ligious doctrine.  The immensity of the task that was facing Islamic
finance at its inception—creating a finance practice based on medieval
texts with the slightest degree of relevance to the contemporary
world—should not be gainsaid.  Anyone seeking to make the effort in
the previous century, when modern Islamic finance effectively be-
gan,130 was faced with a set of rules that can only be described as woe-
fully anachronistic, if well developed for their time.131  A general
theory of contract was absent from medieval Islamic commercial
law.132  The medieval texts were rife with rules on conditions that
might not be placed in contracts for sale.133  Even limitations respect-
ing speculation were over matters that seemed either ridiculous or of-
127. HIRSCHL, supra note 85, at 206–40.
128. Id. at 206.
129. LEVINSON, supra note 2.
130. The first Islamic banks were opened in the middle of the twentieth century.  Hamoudi,
supra note 89, at 91.
131. Haider Ala Hamoudi, The Muezzin’s Call and the Dow Jones Bell: On the Necessity of
Realism in the Study of Islamic Law, 56 AM. J. COMP. L. 423, 436 (2008).
132. Id. at 438.
133. Id. at 439.
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fensive (sale of the sperm of a stallion or purchase of the right to a
runaway slave), hardly the rules from which a modern commercial
practice could possibly be sensibly built.134  This, to be clear, is not an
indictment of the rules in themselves, which as Professor Kuran notes
no doubt worked well for their time,135 so much as a description of
their general inapplicability in our own time.
By itself, this might not create significant barriers, as polities around
the world have managed to adapt their legal systems creatively to
meet current needs.136  Two additional problems existed as concerned
Islamic finance, however.  The first was that at the time when it first
arose in force, in the latter half of the previous century, the commer-
cial and financial legal regimes of the Muslim world were transplants
from Western Europe.137  Modern Islamic rules needed to be devel-
oped against the backdrop of legal systems that paid no attention to
them.
The second factor is even more relevant for our purposes, and what
makes commitment to the practice of Islamic finance such a compel-
ling analogy to American commercial commitment to the Code.  As
anyone even faintly familiar with geopolitical realities knows, there is
no single Muslim regime, or any singular Muslim polity, in any but the
most symbolic sense.  Rather, the Muslim world has been divided into
individual nation-states, and an increasing number of Muslims have
begun to live outside of the Muslim world entirely through emigra-
tion.  The level of coordination that would be necessary to achieve
anything by way of uniform practice is daunting.
There are many reasons that Islamic finance managed to prolifer-
ate, and grow incredibly fast, notwithstanding these formidable obsta-
cles, such that it is a practice with nearly $1 trillion in assets at the
present time.138  Most of them relate to a broad Muslim dissatisfaction
with dominant global financial and economic paradigms, and a desire
134. Id. at 441.
135. Timur Kuran, The Scale of Entrepreneurship in Middle Eastern History: Inhibitive Roles
of Islamic Institutions, 19–21 (Econ. Research Initiatives at Duke, Working Paper No. 10, 2008),
available at http://papers.ssrn.com/abstract_id=1265117.
136. The evolution of our own 1789 Constitution, whose drafters surely did not envision the
state in which we currently reside, is only one example.
137. Hamoudi, supra note 89, at 91; Lama Abu-Odeh, The Politics of (Mis)Recognition: Is-
lamic Law Pedagogy in American Academia, 52 AM. J. COMP. L. 789, 800–01 (2004).
138. Fouad Al-Salam, The Size and Scope of Islamic Finance: An Analysis, 25 INT’L J. MGMT.
124, 125 (2008). This figure, from a March 2008 article, appears to be based on some level of
reasonable analysis. Estimates vary from commentator to commentator, and in any event are
hard to rely upon, as it is unimaginable that all financial institutions operating on a shari’a com-
pliant basis, even if they could be located and counted, would be completely forthcoming on
assets they currently have.
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for something more Islamically authentic, articulated as fairer, and
more cognizant of social justice.139  For example, medieval prohibi-
tions on the trades of certain commodities were transformed into the
prohibition of money interest on a loan.140  The basis for this ban was
that leading advocates of Islamic finance deemed it to be fairer than
conventional finance because it prevented a rapacious capitalist class
from effectively enslaving a working class by requiring laborers to
take out debt for any projects they undertook, and to guarantee a re-
turn to the capitalists even if the debtors lost money on their ven-
tures.141  Similarly, bans on speculation were understood to prevent
one side of a transaction from being able to profit at the expense of
the other on the basis of a change in external circumstances.142  In
place of this world of heartlessness, with its winners and losers, its
uncaring rich and its suffering poor, Islam was presumed to favor risk
sharing, where profits and losses were won and lost by participants in
a venture together, and no party could earn money while another lost
it.143  All of this is recounted in other accounts of Islamic finance, and
hardly needs more extensive treatment here.  It suffices to say that for
a variety of reasons, all of which are grounded in one way or another
in the economic realities of our times, Islamic finance never succeeded
along these lines, but instead expanded as successfully as it did by
mimicking conventional financing techniques using alternative vehi-
cles which achieve interest in all but name.144
The aspect of the story that goes unreported, however, is the extent
to which the practice maintains its cohesiveness and general uniformity
in the absence of anything like a governing Code.  While there are
respected organizations, among them the Accounting and Auditing
Organization of Islamic Financial Institutions (AAOIFI), which issue
guidelines respecting Islamic financial practices,145 they are often
more honored in their breach than their observance.146  The actual
139. Hamoudi, supra note 130, at 433.
140. Id. at 447–49.
141. Id. at 452–53.
142. Id. at 454.
143. Id.
144. Hamoudi, supra note 87, at 91.
145. Holly E. Robbins, Note, Soul Searching and Profit Seeking: Reconciling the Competing
Goals of Islamic Finance, 88 TEX. L. REV. 1125, 1133 (2010).
146. This is stated in characteristically elegant, yet diplomatic, terms, by a prominent law part-
ner in the field, Philip Abbott of the Dubai office of Simmons and Simmons.  After describing
AAOIFI’s role in setting standards for the field, he adds, however, that “market practice changes
rapidly and therefore it is important to deploy market knowledge in the structuring stage of a
transaction to save costs later on.”  Lucy Trevelyan, Weathering the Storm, INT’L B. ASS’N
GLOBAL INSIGHT, Apr. 2010, http://www.ibanet.org/Article/Detail.aspx?ArticleUid=03AE9031-
8C66-48F3-906E-0B4BFADE5D37.
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certification of a particular transaction as suitably shari’a compliant
comes not from adherence to any set of standards but rather the ap-
proval of a “shari’a review board” of the institution designing the
transaction.147  To require each transaction to obtain the independent
approval of a board of experts on the basis of difficult-to-ascertain
criteria seems as if the practice would certainly devolve into entire
incoherence as everyone claimed that anything imaginable was “Is-
lamic,” thereby making the term only one of marketing and not one
signifying respect to any single set of rules. Perhaps counterintuitively,
this has not proved to be the case.
This is not to say that the highly individualized and nonpublic
method of ensuring shari’a compliance does not facilitate some form
of rule-stretching and dubious transactional forms.  While one could
not know the extent of such practices given their nonpublic nature,
one must assume that some level of considerable rule stretching does
occur, and that this might even be the reason that a more formal set of
rules for the practice universally applied has yet to be developed.
Still, a certain practical coherence has taken hold that is undeniable.
Particular bans appear at least formally absolute, most centrally, the
taking of interest on debt.148  Those reformist Muslims who argue,
plausibly enough, that the shari’a could be understood otherwise,149
are safely dismissed not quite as heretics, but as contemptible enough
fellows—defeatist and apologists.150 Even practices that existed with
some frequency in the classical world are dismissed as unacceptable
heresies. The most obvious example is bay al-ina, where an object is
sold for immediate cash, and then bought back by the original seller
with a promise to pay a higher amount in the future.151  This is in
Islamic finance universally dismissed as un-Islamic, an unacceptable
circumventing of God’s rule.  Other innovations, such as the
murabaha, not much different from bay al-ina except involving a third
147. Id.
148. See COUNCIL OF ISLAMIC IDEOLOGY, CONSOLIDATED RECOMMENDATIONS ON THE IS-
LAMIC ECONOMIC SYSTEM 7 (1983) (indicating the presence of “complete unanimity among all
schools of thought in Islam that the term riba stands for interest in all its types and forms”).
149. See Haider Ala Hamoudi, Jurisprudential Schizophrenia: On Form and Function in Is-
lamic Finance, 7 CHI. J. INT’L L. 605, 611 (2007) (describing one approach to render the ban on
interest inapplicable).
150. MUHAMMAD NEJATULLAH SIDDIQI, BANKING WITHOUT INTEREST 7 (1983) (describing
the position permitting some forms of interest as “defeatist”); Muhammad Uzair, The Impact of
Interest Free Banking, 3 J. ISLAMIC BANKING & FIN. 39, 40 (1984) (“By this time, there is a
complete consensus of all . . . schools . . . and among Islamic economists that interest in all forms,
of all kinds, and for all purposes is completely prohibited in Islam. Gone are the days when
people were apologetic about Islam and contended that interest for commercial and business
purposes, as presently charged by banks, was not prohibited . . . .”)
151. Hamoudi, supra note 131, at 443, 462.
\\jciprod01\productn\D\DPB\10-2\DPB203.txt unknown Seq: 31 26-JAN-12 9:49
2012] THE AMERICAN COMMERCIAL RELIGION 331
party, are by contrast embraced, or at least sanctioned, and form the
backbone of the practice.152 Again, in the absence of any authority
governing them, such matters of consensus have been achieved.
As new practices and new innovations develop, Islamic finance de-
velops rules to govern them with similar uniformity.  Once such rules
promulgate, actors are hesitant to defy them, preferring to find a
means of compliance rather than attempt to explain their heresies as
somehow sound.  An excellent example comes by way of the Islamic
bond known as the sukuk. Told that the bondholder needed to
“share” in profits and losses with the issuer as concerns whatever ven-
ture the issuer was engaged in, rather than receive a fixed interest
based return, many financiers structured the transactions with a “tar-
get rate” based on a market measure such as the London Interbank
Offering Rate (LIBOR).153  They then offered to the sukuk holder an
interest free nonrecourse loan whenever the target rate was not met,
and to the issuer a “reward” whenever the target rate was exceeded.
The “reward” could be used to pay back the loan, thereby creating a
conventional bond.154  It took a single, prominent Islamic finance ex-
pert to express disapproval of the practice, and in particular that por-
tion related to the liberal resort to a non-recourse, interest free loan
for the entire sukuk market to suffer dramatic reversals.155  The broad
expectation is that as time progresses there will be a broad reformula-
tion of the market to rid it of these sorts of innovations and
heresies.156
What is striking is that precisely as with the Code’s institutions, no
authority exists with legal power to control or limit what might be
called a transaction in “Islamic finance.”  Actors are perfectly free to
ignore Islamic finance dictates and structure their transactions any
way they wish, simply by convening a shari’a review board to their
liking to bless it.  Similarly, states are free to write their own indepen-
dent and nonuniform code in derogation of the PEB, and an agunah is
free to file for civil divorce and marry anyone she wishes.  But when
the matter is religious, and the penalty is heresy, blasphemy or exclu-
sion from the community, as the case may be, the legal rules do not
152. Id. at 462.
153. Haider Ala Hamoudi. Legal Lip Service, FORBES (Apr. 21, 2008, 6:00 PM), http://
www.forbes.com/2008/04/21/islamic-religious-banking-islamic-finance-cx_hh_islamicfinance08_
0421spirit.html.
154. Id.
155. Id.; Michael J.T. McMillen, Asset Securitization Sukuk And Islamic Capital Markets:
Structural Issues In These Formative Years, 25 WISC. INT’L. L. J. 703, 743 (2008).
156. See McMillen, supra note 155, at 743-44.
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offer the best guide as to compliance.  Commercial religion, that is,
proves remarkably effective as a form of constraint.
III. THE PROBLEMS OF COMMERCIAL RELIGION
A. The Global Context
Does this, however, create a problem?  One immediate reply is that
it could, in that it could restrain state competition in areas in which it
would be more sensible to encourage it.  We have seen such an exam-
ple, or at least we potentially have, in the case of § 9-503.157  Other
dangers to uniformity as a more general matter, identified by Profes-
sors Ribstein and Kobayashi as they concern the enactment of uni-
form legislation generally (as opposed to enactment of uniform
legislation with select nonuniform amendments) would include the
difficulty of exit (as voters went to jurisdictions where they felt that
the rules reflected their preferences better) and the ability to take into
account local variation.158  One of the reasons, for example, that Texas
may have been quick to enact § 9-503 relates to the naming conven-
tions of Hispanics, which result in names that might appear differ-
ently, or in different orders, in different official documents.159
At the same time, it is at least plausible to maintain that such exam-
ples are quite limited and are dwarfed by the advantages that uniform-
ity more generally has provided.  Perhaps, it might be argued,
America’s religious attachment to the Code manifests itself in some
contexts in more strident a manner than is necessary, but the general
effect of the uniformity can scarcely be doubted.
To see the more serious problem, one must look beyond American
borders, and see the effects of America’s adherence to its commercial
religion on abilities to achieve some measure of uniformity across
competing commercial law regimes.
Because of America’s near religious faith in our own Holy Text and
the High Church meant to preserve it, the United States has advanced
something akin to broad scale proselytization to convert the world to
its modalities of commercial regulation.  This has, by and large, failed.
I shall demonstrate this failure by reference to two of the Code’s more
prominent sections, both of which deal with areas of commerce in des-
perate need of uniformity, albeit in largely different manners.  The
balance of this Part shall deal with global divisions over security for a
157. U.C.C. § 9-503 (2001).
158. Ribstein & Kobayashi, supra note 16, at 140–41.
159. U.C.C. § 9-503; Susan E. Collins & Paul Hodnefeld, Current Revised Article 9 Search and
Filing Issues, 42 TEX. J. BUS. L. 275, 284 (2007) (describing issues concerning Hispanic names).
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loan and America’s implicit and unintended role in helping maintain
the divisions; and the next Part shall deal with problems attaching to
the sale of goods, notwithstanding the widely adopted Convention for
the International Sale of Goods.
B. The Contest Over Article 9
Perhaps it behooves us, in addressing the deep structural problems
attaching to global uniformity in secured transactions, to begin at the
beginning; namely, a fuller description of the policies that underlie a
secured credit regime.
The benefits of secured credit are obvious to anyone who has
sought to take out a mortgage.  Interest rates are considerably lower
for a secured loan than they would be if there were no security regime
for the obvious reason that debtor default does not pose as great a risk
to the creditor when it is able to collect on proceeds arising from a
sale of the secured property.  There are two downsides, however, in-
volving more vulnerable societal elements whom Professor Gilmore
referred to, perhaps figuratively, as “widows and orphans.”160  The
first relates to consumer protection, and ensuring that the individual
consumer debtor is well aware of the consequences of permitting a
lien to be placed on her personal property.  Such protection, for exam-
ple, would address concerns that an automobile purchaser may not
understand the terms of repossession of her automobile.  It could also
deal with even more troubling practices involving purchase money se-
curity interests placed by stores on their credit cards with no more
than language on the back of a charge slip.161  These very real con-
cerns are, it can fairly be said, more acute in the domestic context than
in the international:  it is rare that consumers of this sort are part of a
cross-border insolvency.
The more serious threat to Gilmore’s figurative “widows and or-
phans” from an international perspective relates to the relationship of
different classes of creditors to one another.  To permit creditors to
assert broadly security interests over any conceivable property of the
debtor (bank accounts, revenue streams, tangible assets, etc.) often
leaves nothing for junior or unsecured creditors.  To the extent that
these junior creditors are junk bondholders who were receiving rela-
tively high interest payments corresponding to a risk premium, the
matter might well be dismissed as a gamble that did not pay off.  To
160. Grant Gilmore, The Good Faith Purchase Idea and the Uniform Commercial Code: Con-
fessions of a Repentant Draftsman, 15 GA. L. REV. 605, 620 (1981).
161. Janger, supra note 36, at 612.
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the extent, however, that such creditors are involuntary creditors—an
employer’s pension fund, its employee compensation fund, its health
plan, tort victims injured by the employer with unsatisfied claims
against the employer—the matter becomes more troublesome.
The incentives of the firm are positively perverse under such a situ-
ation.  To use a concrete example, if a company manufacturing oil
drilling equipment is leveraged enough, so that it was (using entirely
hypothetical numbers) a $700 million company with $750 million in
liens filed against it, the wiser financial course would be to take exces-
sive risks to produce its equipment cheaply so as to boost profits and
increase its net worth.  In the event that there is an occurrence (say
the failure of the equipment leading to a catastrophic oil spill) that
results in significant tort claims made against the company, the claims
are hardly things to fear, as the company will not have to pay them.  If
the company petitions for bankruptcy, its secured creditors would liq-
uidate it, acquire its assets and leave the tort claims unpaid.   Neither
they nor the company need be concerned.  The trustee in bankruptcy
is powerless to change the result—the trustee takes the place of a hy-
pothetical lien creditor on the date of the bankruptcy petition, thereby
rendering the trustee junior to secured claims already made.162  The in-
centive of the firm then is to satisfy its secured creditors at the ex-
pense of everyone else.
The problem is thus clear enough.  Facilitate too much secured
credit too easily, and tort victims go unpaid.  Employees are dismissed
from their company and unable to make claims on their pensions be-
cause of the employer’s insolvency  Facilitate too little, and the cost
of credit rises unacceptably, consumers are unable to purchase homes
or cars at reasonable prices, and economic slowdown is inevitable.
The question is largely one of balance, as between the obvious social
good provided by cheap commercial credit, and the equally obvious
social good of protected consumers, employees, and tort victims.
Without going into legislative details, it is both fair and uncon-
troversial to say that Article 9 as originally drafted ran to the obvious
advantage of large financial institutions at the expense of the more
vulnerable.  Gilmore himself expressed this concern respecting the
original Article 9, of which he was a primary draftsman, shortly before
his death.163  Musing on the wisdom of Judge Hand’s earlier expressed
skepticism respecting secured property, Gilmore asked, “why on earth
162. 11 U.S.C. § 544 (1994).
163. The two primary authors of original Article 9 were Gilmore and Alison Dunham.  Janger,
supra note 36, at 571.
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should the fruits of a known insolvent’s labors feed the assignee while
all the other creditors starve?”164
Given that even the draftsman of the original Code had discussed
possible negative effects of the secured credit regime he had created,
when the time came to enact a revised Article 9, a fair number of
respectable authorities rose to offer greater protections to the un-
secured creditors.  Gail Hillebrand was in the forefront of efforts to
provide consumer protection.165  Most prominently concerning the
problem of unsecured creditors, no less an authority than Elizabeth
Warren proposed an ingenious solution whereby a trustee in bank-
ruptcy would be required to set aside twenty percent of a debtor’s
estate to satisfy the claims of unsecured creditors.166  Two equally im-
pressive and authoritative scholars, Professors Bebchuck and Fried,
adopting law and economics arguments, expressed similar concerns as
those identified above.  They proposed either a system of “partial pri-
ority,” wherein a secured creditor would, under a variety of different
formulations, be required to see part of its secured claim treated as on
par with existing unsecured claims, or one granting involuntary credi-
tors priority.167  Around the same time, Professor LoPucki famously
argued that there was no reason that involuntary creditors should be
junior in priority over secured creditors and many reasons to reverse
that priority.168
To describe this latter set of proposals as having been rejected sum-
marily by the committee charged to revise Article 9 is to understate
the matter.  They were not even considered, with a tone that at times
bordered on the contemptuous.  In a swipe clearly aimed at the sub-
stantial work of Bebchuck and Fried on the inefficiency of the existing
regime, the co-reporters of the Drafting Committee, Charles Mooney
and Steven Harris, described the “efficiency literature” as “interest-
ing” but somehow not “cogent.”169  Those concerned about the effects
upon unsecured creditors were portrayed almost as hopeless bleeding
hearts, dismissed derisively by Mooney and Harris as “Symps,” or
purveyors of “Sympathetic Legal Studies.”170
164. Gilmore, supra note 160, at 627 (discussing Hand’s decision in Rockmore v. Lehman).
165. Janger, supra note 36, at 612.
166. Elizabeth Warren, Article 9 Set-Aside for Unsecured Creditors, 51 CONSUMER FIN. L. Q.
REP. 323, 323 (1997).
167. Lucian Arye Bebchuk & Jesse M. Fried, The Uneasy Case for the Priority of Secured
Claims in Bankruptcy, 105 YALE L.J. 857, 905–12 (1996).
168. Lynn M. LoPucki, The Unsecured Creditor’s Bargain, 80 VA. L. REV. 1887, 1891 (1994).
169. Steven L. Harris & Charles W. Mooney, Jr., A Property-Based Theory of Security Inter-
ests: Taking Debtors’ Choices Seriously, 80 VA. L. REV. 2021, 2023–24 (1994).
170. Id. at 2045.
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Concerns about consumer protection received a more sympathetic
hearing from the Drafting Committee, though the ultimate result is no
better than the original Article 9 and was very nearly much worse
absent last minute maneuvering.171  The concerns about “anticipated
capture” and the influence of banking interests of course can hardly
be discounted in the reaching of this result.172  Nevertheless, whatever
the reason, the revisions to Article 9, much like the original, discount
and ignore the objections of scholars who suggested limitations on the
free availability of secured credit.
C. Transnational Objections to Secured Credit
To be clear, the point of the previous section was not to reignite a
debate that effectively ended with the adoption of Revised Article 9 in
2001.  That issue has been decided in the United States, at least for
now.  It is enough to note that there are competing policies and inter-
ests involved, and that in credit-addled America, the notion of facili-
tating cheaper loans at the expense of almost any other interest
imaginable comes not as an entire surprise.
The broader point is that once one leaves the United States, priori-
ties are quite different, and those whom Mooney and Harris dismiss as
“Symps” have a far greater hearing.  This was clear in the UNCI-
TRAL efforts to develop “legislative guidelines” for a more effective
secured transactions law.173  Entering into what was known as Work-
ing Group VI, it was clear to participants that many nations were un-
convinced that the social benefits that come with cheap credit were
more substantial than those brought about by ensuring the fiscal
health of pension funds, health care, worker’s compensation and the
like, even in insolvency proceedings.174
Evidence of this sentiment is evident in existing laws across devel-
oped and undeveloped jurisdictions in all parts of the globe.  France,
for example, subordinates secured claims to those of unpaid employ-
ees.175  Germany appears to have adopted provisions quite similar, if
more limited, than those proposed by Warren, Bebchuck and Fried,
171. Janger, supra note 36, at 613.
172. Id.
173. UNCITRAL Legislative Guide on Secured Transactions, UNITED NATIONS (2009), http://
www.uncitral.org/pdf/english/texts/security-lg/e/Terminology-and-Recs.18-1-10.pdf [hereinafter
UNCITRAL Legislative Guide].
174. Roderick A. Macdonald, Three Metaphors of Norm Migration in International Context,
34 BROOK. J. INT’L L. 603, 638–39 (2009).
175. James Leavy, France, in CROSS-BORDER SECURITY OVER TANGIBLES 101, 108–09 (Harry
C. Sigman & Eva-Maria Kieninger eds. 2007).
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setting aside nine percent of claims for unsecured creditors.176  Italy
not only provides a list of creditors who are prioritized over those of
secured creditors, but has expanded the list in 2006.177  In my own ex-
tensive dealings with relevant committees within Iraq’s Council of
Representatives, the notion of security interests in personal property
is often treated with noticeable hostility, with the notion of prioritiza-
tion of the secured claim over involuntary, unsecured claims being
among the premier objections.  Following discussions over secured
credit, a consumer protection law in which I played some role nearly
included provisions limiting the applicability of secured credit, and
this in a jurisdiction that does not yet recognize nonpossessory liens.
The mere threat of more easily obtained secured credit was enough to
induce consideration of consumer protection concerns, preemptively.
In addition, most of East Asia tends to prioritize employee claims
over those of secured creditors as well, though China has recently
changed its law so as not to do so.178
There is thus considerable variation around the globe on these core
policy questions, with comparatively few nations persuaded by
America’s extreme pro-creditor approach.  There is also variation
around the globe respecting archaic rules on secured transactions that
do not appear to serve any contemporary policy interest.  As noted,
Iraq’s current law generally requires liens either to be possessory, or
some sort of document of title needs to be placed with the creditor,179
a largely pointless historical artifact that has its antecedents in Islamic
Law as developed in the medieval era.180  This is not altogether differ-
ent from many systems in predominantly Muslim countries.181  In
other nations, similarly outdated rules exist.  Among them is the re-
quirement that security can only be taken out over a tangible object,
as opposed to, for example, accounts receivable.182  Such require-
ments, limiting both the types of property over which security could
176. Julia Rakob, Germany, in CROSS-BORDER SECURITY OVER TANGIBLES 63, 70–71 (Harry
Sigman & Eva-Maria Kieninger eds. 2007).
177. Anna Veneziano, Italy, in CROSS-BORDER SECURITY OVER TANGIBLES 159, 160–61
(Harry Sigman and & Eva-Maria Kieninger eds. 2007).
178. Douglas W. Arner et al., Property Rights, Collateral, Creditor Rights, and Insolvency in
East Asia, 42 TEX. INT’L L.J. 515, 557 (2007).
179. CODE CIVIL arts. 1322–33 (1951) (Iraq), available at http://gjpi.org/wp-content/uploads/
2009/01/civilcode928-end-x.pdf. See also Mark J. Sundahl, Iraq, Secured Transactions, and the
Promise of Islamic Law, 40 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 1301, 1335 (2007).
180. Nicholas H.D. Foster, The Islamic Law of Real Security, 15 ARAB L.Q. 131, 136 (2000).
181. See, e.g., Michael J.T. McMillen, Islamic Shari’ah-Compliant Project Finance: Collateral
Security and Financing Structure Case Studies, 24 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 1184, 1221–22 (2001)
(describing Saudi Arabia).
182. See, e.g., QANUNI MADANI [Civil Code] 1928, art. 774 (Iran), available at http://www.
unhcr.org/refworld/country,LEGAL,,LEGISLATION,IRN,,49997adb27,0.html.
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be had and requiring possession by the secured creditor, made sense
in a world lacking sophisticated accounting or filing systems where
creditors could be put on notice. Possession may well have been the
only sensible way to notify the world that the property was secured by
a third party.  However, such rules are, to borrow the phrasing of
Mooney and Harris, lacking in “cogent support” in any jurisdictions
that are capable of maintaining adequate recording systems and in
which decent accounting is possible.183  These draconian restrictions
may well limit the ability of a debtor to tie up all of its assets in secur-
ity, thereby leaving funds for unsecured and involuntary creditors.
However, this is done at such a high price that it could fairly be argued
that alternative and more limited means would be simultaneously
more effective while still achieving the more substantial goal of a
broad secured credit regime.
Adding to the difficulty is that unlike questions concerning the sale
of goods, which may be handled by choice of law rules relatively well,
secured credit requires something by way of uniformity in an increas-
ingly globalized environment if it is to function.  Professors Cohen and
Smith do an admirable job describing why that is in the context of an
excellent article describing some of the advantages and limitations of
Article 9 internationally.184  To reduce the matter considerably, and to
focus on only two more relevant issues, a mere choice of law in a
credit agreement as between secured creditor and debtor could hardly
serve to the end the matter, as future controversies will in many cases
not be between those two parties, but rather between the secured
creditor and unsecured or junior creditors, none of whom have signed
the financing statement.185  Moreover, if the property is an asset which
is not located in the United States, what American courts have to say
about it will be of relatively little value.186
Thus, there is a significant divergence of secured transactions sys-
tems across the globe, and an urgent need for both harmonization and
reform.  In a world in which developed economies are consistently
seeking sources of income in the developing world, and in which the
developing world is seeking foreign investment, nothing could be
more salutary than coming to agreement on a basic set of parameters.
These would include discarding unnecessary artifacts that serve no
purpose, and opening a frank and full discussion over the areas of
183. Harris & Mooney, Jr., supra note 170, at 2023–24.
184. Neil B. Cohen & Edwin E. Smith, International Secured Transactions and Revised UCC
Article 9, 74 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 1191, 1220–54 (1999).
185. Id. at 1236–37.
186. Id. at 1222.
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ideological division that do exist, among them the benefits of cheap
credit on the one hand, and the rights of involuntary and unsecured
creditors and broader notions of consumer protection on the other.  If
such an undertaking were attempted, its possibilities of success given
the material advantages seem fairly significant.
I do not mean by this, I want to stress, that this would result in the
creation of a global uniform code that would necessarily replace Arti-
cle 9.  I imagine that, to use the simplest example, European concerns
over consumer protection are significantly strong, and American
desires for cheap credit significantly deep, that a single uniform code
to replace all domestic legislation would be extraordinarily difficult,
and this as among jurisdictions with remarkably similar political sys-
tems and values.  Yet some form of global convergence on some set of
parameters might be possible.  Treaties of significant scope could be
contemplated, and a model law or set of laws, offering different pos-
sibilities and the advantages and disadvantages of each could be ex-
plored.  Steps, that is, could be taken to accommodate different global
systems in a manner that would help to ensure the freer flow of capital
across jurisdictions.
D. Article 9 and the World
Unfortunately, instead of such a conversation and potential result-
ing convergence, what we witness is a transnational effort toward uni-
formity in the area of secured transactions of a different sort.  It is best
described as American commercial law advocates proselytizing for the
effective adoption of the 2001 version of Article 9 worldwide with
what can only be described as the zeal of the convert.
The advocacy for America’s commercial religion is phrased in lan-
guage that is both parochial and universalist, so extreme in its cer-
tainty of the rightness of America’s path that proponents of other
legislation in other transnational contexts would be embarrassed to
use it.  Drafters Mooney and Harris inform us that “many” believe
that we have “the most successful commercial statute ever” in Article
9, the type of unfathomable hyperbole we only expect to hear about
the United States as a nation, and even then only on Fox News.187
Our own casebooks, with which we train the next generation of Amer-
ican lawyers, find it untroubling to describe Article 9 in very similar
terms.188  The view that this singular piece of legislation is the best law
187. Harris & Mooney, Jr., supra note 169, at 2021 (“In embarking upon the revision of what
many consider the most successful commercial statute ever[.]”).
188. WARREN & WALT, supra note 29, at 11 (endorsing “the widespread view that former
Article 9 was the best commercial law statute ever written”).
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that has ever been written, not only in the area of secured transactions,
but in all of commerce, is, as Professors Warren and Walt have noted,
“widespread” (albeit only in American circles).189  Other than the
Qur’an, and that in Islamic class as a child, I do not believe I have
heard such a thing about any text.
When a community of believers, in this case much of the American
commercial law elite, know the Truth (and it is hard to attach anything
less than “Truth” to a suggestion that a piece of legislation is the “best
ever”), there is nothing that can dislodge them of it.  They will not
seek grounds on which to develop in some limited space where accom-
modation is possible an alternative system of secured financing to that
which is the “best ever”; they will merely try to convert others to the
supposed “widespread view”.  Unsurprisingly as a result, there is
nothing by way of acknowledgement that other approaches merit con-
sideration, as they are merely “Symps,” adherents to a different relig-
ion, one lacking “cogent support,” no more worthy of consideration
than it would be worthy for a Christian to consider adding several
other gods to the Trinity.
Examples are many.  In the context of Europe, the very notion that
employees are to be protected in insolvency meets with scorn, without
much by way of explanation.  Sigman’s work on “reforming” secured
transactions around the globe is typical, a clear repudiation of priority
to other classes of creditors except perhaps, and only perhaps, at the
very margins.190  Those who have written chapters on his work on al-
ternative systems in Europe have apparently joined the faith.  They
treat the notion of priority to involuntary creditors with some apology
and embarrassment, dismissing the substantial reservation of nine per-
cent of assets in Germany as being “very limited,”191 and protection of
primarily involuntary creditors in Italy as “unsatisfactory.”192  The
idea that these economically developed jurisdictions have reasons for
such laws, which might be why (at least in the case of Italy) they have
strengthened rather than weakened them in recent years, does not
seem to come up.
Beyond Europe, the contempt is even more forthright.  One of the
major reforms that proselytizers deem necessary in Asia is granting
further priority to creditors over unsecured employee claims for
189. Id.
190. Harry Sigman, Introduction, in CROSS-BORDER SECURITY OVER TANGIBLES 1, 9–10
(Harry Sigman & Eva-Maria Kieninger eds. 2007).
191. Rakob, supra note 176, at 70.
192. Veneziano, supra note 177, at 161.
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wages.193  No explanation is offered as to why—apparently it is self
evident that a civilized nation would deem it less important for its
workers to receive back pay (which can hardly be very much of a com-
pany’s debt) as the company goes bankrupt rather than that Citibank
maximizes its return.  Even if our own academy had a thorough de-
bate on precisely this subject at the time of the Article 9 revisions, we
have had the benefit of the Church’s rulings on the matter about a
decade ago.  In light of that, we no longer see enough merit in alterna-
tive systems even to discuss them, except as artifacts that need to be
discarded.  And why should we?  Such protections are not part of Ar-
ticle 9, the Holy Text and the “best commercial law statute ever,”194
and hence cannot possibly be valid.
Lest one think this Holy Text, approved by our institutional Church,
applies only to the chosen rich and developed, Revised Article 9 of-
fers much more.  Apparently it is “essential for the success of Iraq’s
future economic stability” to create a “progressive” secured transac-
tions law, whose elements mirror Revised Article 9.195  Left unex-
plained is precisely why this is so in light of the fact that Iraq’s
revenue is likely to be oil driven at least for the near future and that
oil companies seem content to invest significant sums elsewhere (in-
cluding neighboring Saudi Arabia)196 without such a “progressive”
law.  For the even more desperately poor states of the world, secured
transactions alleviate poverty.197  The Chinese factory worker who has
lost his arm in a workplace accident due to inadequate safety mea-
sures and is now unable to recover from his employer because interna-
tional banks have priority over him in insolvency proceedings might
be excused for concluding otherwise.  Whatever the state, and
whatever the problem—economic development in post conflict socie-
ties to intractable poverty in desperately poor ones to enhancing
wealth in already developed ones—the “best commercial law statute
ever”198 can solve it, which is why the believers are puzzled as to why
the entire world hasn’t enacted it.  Representatives of nations that
might ask why it is that they must adopt the American model are ac-
cused incongruously of “autochthonous” behavior, lumped together
with advocates of “Marxist-inspired” models of economic develop-
193. Arner et al., supra note 178, at 557.
194. WARREN & WALT, supra note 29, at 11.
195. Sundahl, supra note 179, at 1303.
196. McMillen, supra note 181, at 1221–22.
197. Boris Kozolchyk, Secured Lending and its Poverty Reduction Effect, 42 TEX. INT’L L.J.
727 (2007).
198. WARREN & WALT, supra note 29, at 11.
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ment and “return to nature” types, incapable of comprehending the
benefits of capitalism.199
Only to the skeptic is the accusation odd.  The skeptic might wonder
how the United States could accuse other states of clinging excessively
to their own organic secured transactions models while at the same
time demanding global compliance to the American model.  Is not that
very proselytization an even greater example of excessive enchant-
ment with one’s own law?  “Autochthonous” behavior par excellence?
Yet to the believer in a proselytizing religion, it is not so, for the Word
is not in fact applicable only to the believer, but to all the peoples of
the world who only need to understand its virtues to be saved, from
whatever it is (poverty, resource curse, or anything else) that might
afflict them—to live, if you will, the Good Life.  Only a refusal to
adopt the Word is parochial, a refusal to see a Universal Light appar-
ent to the believer.
Yet despite the zeal, the missionaries of American commercial law,
even with America’s firm economic resolve behind them, have man-
aged only the most limited of successes.  It is true that the United
States managed to use the UNCITRAL process to push through
Working Group VI a Legislative Guide respecting secured transac-
tions that replicated Revised Article 9 in large part, published by UN-
CITRAL in 2009 after many years of work.200  The Legislative Guide
does offer helpful proposals, among them the removal of distinctions
as between possessory and non-possessory liens and the permissibility
of security to be obtained over intangible and even inchoate assets.201
Yet because this is a legislative guide and not a model law, it does
not propose a law so much as provide recommendations on how to
create one.  As a result, core ideological disputes could safely be
avoided, at least in part.  For example, the guidelines do not prevent
the law from creating preferences over secured creditors as to secured
property.  They merely require that the law “limit” those preferences,
and that they be described “in a clear and specific way,” a proposal I
cannot imagine many would find objection with.202  Parameters that
would be useful (who might have such priority, why might they have
it, what are the limitations respecting it) are absent.  In any event, in a
world in which the best that UNCITRAL could do was a Legislative
199. Boris Kozolchyk, Modernization of Commercial Law: International Uniformity and Eco-
nomic Development, 34 BROOK. J. INT’l L. 709, 715 (2009).
200. Macdonald, supra note 174, at 640–41; UNCITRAL Legislative Guide, supra note 173.
201. UNCITRAL Legislative Guide, supra note 173, ¶¶ 1(e), 16.
202. Id. ¶ 83.  The proposal does not provide, as Warren, Bebchuck and Fried had suggested
in the American context, the possibility of a set aside for unsecured creditor. Id. ¶ 84.
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Guide, not a model law, and even that after seven full years of effort,
it is fair to describe harmonization as being some time away.
The United States cannot even manage to influence its own neigh-
bors very much.  Canada unsurprisingly has a secured transactions
law, at least in the English speaking part of the country, which resem-
bles Revised Article 9.203  Elsewhere, the story is hardly as encourag-
ing.  In a splendid article describing American pressure to impose
Revised Article 9 globally, and corresponding Argentinean reticence
that is similar in character to that shared by much of the globe, Profes-
sors Moglia Claps and McDonnell indicate that Argentina’s legal com-
munity rejected efforts by its own banks to promote Revised Article
9.204  More broadly, the Organization of American States has created
a model law for use in the Western hemisphere, which has similarly
failed for the most part.  Only a handful of small Central American
states have adhered, as well as Peru, which found it unsatisfactory
enough to make significant changes thereto.205  Even Mexico only
partially adopted that model law, despite intense pressure put upon it
by the United States.206
Elsewhere the story is similar.  We have seen what American law-
yers think of Asian models of secured transactions systems that favor
employees in a venture over large financial institutions lending to it.207
The reaction of Asia itself has been decidedly cooler, even among pro-
ponents of secured transactions reform.  While promoting a set of
principles respecting secured transactions that resembles in some part
Revised Article 9, the Asian Development Bank has at times shown
impatience with American proselytization, arguing in a 2000 report
that “there is no single model of a secured transactions legal regime”
and that “this is not an area where one refers glibly to common law
rules, general standards or global ‘best international practices.’”208
203. Hale E. Sheppard, Overcoming Apathetic Internationalism to Generate Hemispheric Ben-
efits: Analysis of and Arguments for Recent Secured Transactions Laws in Mexico, 10 J. TRANS-
NAT’L. L. & POL’Y 133, 135–36 (2001).
204. Guillermo A. Moglia Claps & Julian B. McDonnell, Secured Credit and Insolvency Law
in Argentina and the U.S.: Gaining Insight from a Comparative Perspective, 30 GA. J. INT’L &
COMP. L. 393, 400 (2002).
205. Kozolchyk, supra note 199, at 725–30; Arnold S. Rosenberg et al., International Commer-
cial Transactions, Franchising, and Distribution, 44 Int’l Law. 229 (2010).
206. Sandra M. Rocks & Kate A. Sawyer, International Commercial Law: 2006 Developments,
62 BUS. LAW. 1647, 1657 (2007); Moglia Claps & McDonnell, supra note 204, at 398.
207. See Veneziano, supra note 177.
208. ARJUN GOSWAMI & HAMID SHARIF, ASIAN DEV. BANK, LAW AND POLICY REFORM AT
THE ADB VOL. II, 2000 EDITION v (Dec. 2000), available at http://www.adb.org/documents/
others/law_adb/lpr_2000_2.asp?p=lawdevt#contents.
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The reference to “common law rules” makes fairly clear whose efforts
the ADB was castigating as “glib.”
Europe has shown even less inclination to do very much about its
secured transactions laws.  Efforts to harmonize regimes within Eu-
rope fell apart in 2009, and the E.U. Member States have not signed
the U.N. Convention on the Assignment of Receivables in Trade,
which incorporates principles of Revised Article 9.209  To date, only
four states have signed that convention.  These are the United States,
Madagascar, Liberia and Luxembourg, the final of these with an im-
portant choice of law reservation that has caused much European reti-
cence.210  Needless to say, something is amiss if America can do no
better than enlist Madagascar and Liberia in its cause.
In a well-reasoned, well-considered and thoroughly commendable
article, Professor Sundahl describes in some detail the rather stalled
efforts at reaching some sort of resolution over secured transactions
broadly, and then suggests that hope may come in a different and
more gradualist approach, which he calls the “Cape Town ap-
proach.”211  Under this approach, adopted with respect to the Cape
Town Convention on International Interests in Mobile Equipment, no
effort is made to reach complete harmony over secured transactions,
because frankly the matter is currently impossible.  Instead, a focus is
maintained over those areas in which there is the greatest need for
low-cost financing, among them aircraft, oilrigs, and railway rolling
stock.212  More importantly, rather than seek even agreement on these
limited items, which was likewise impossible, at least in the short term,
a base Convention was acceded to, following which the intention was
to offer a series of protocols to which countries would separately ac-
cede.213  At the time of Sundahl’s article, the first Protocol, concerning
aircraft equipment had not only been finalized but also widely ratified
by over fifty nations, from the United States to Afghanistan,214 mak-
ing the matter rather significant given the near total lack of harmoni-
zation elsewhere.
209. Rosenberg et al., supra note 205, at 230.
210. Id.; Status 2001 - United Nations Convention on the Assignment of Receivables in Interna-
tional Trade, UNITED NATIONS COMM’N ON INT’L TRADE L., http://www.uncitral.org/uncitral/en/
uncitral_texts/payments/2001Convention_receivables_status.html (last visited Nov. 26, 2011)
[hereinafter Status 2001].
211. Sundahl, supra note 26, at 345–54 (2006).
212. Id. at 349.
213. Id. at 353.
214. Id. See also INT’L INST. FOR UNIFICATION PRIVATE LAW, http://www.unidroit.org/english/
conventions/mobile-equipment/main.htm (last visited Oct. 30, 2011).
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Unfortunately, however, matters have not developed quite as har-
moniously since.  One other protocol has been adopted, concerning
rolling railway stock, and it is essentially European rather than global,
having been drafted in Luxembourg and adopted by (in addition to
Luxembourg) the E.U., Gabon, Italy and Switzerland.215
I do not mean to suggest by this that Sundahl is not onto something
in this admirable piece, for surely he is.  Yet the limitations of the
achievements in some ways point more clearly to the essential
problems.  Surely there are industries, among them those dealing in
commercial aircraft, space assets and oilrigs, where the balance to be
struck as between cheap credit and the protection of Gilmore’s “wid-
ows and orphans” is somewhat different than that which might be ap-
plicable more generally.  To take the easiest example, it is hard to
believe that very many people think that broad consumer protection is
necessary before a bank may obtain security in connection with a
party’s leveraged purchase of a Boeing 747.  Any widow or orphan
fortunate enough to be purchasing one needs no such protection.
Moreover, the fact that airlines have very strong business related in-
centives to limit the crashing of their aircraft might also limit concerns
relating to involuntary creditors such as tort victims.  Finally, one can-
not discount the significant expense of this sort of equipment as well
as its obvious utility, together making cheap credit rather important in
context.
The more interesting point, however, is that where some progress
toward global convergence has been achieved, it has been where con-
sensus along the lines of Revised Article 9 is most possible. That is to
say, the conversation over harmonization seems as if it might bear
fruit whenever it leads to conclusions that replicate those held by the
priesthood of American commerce.  It has failed, and failed miserably,
in nearly every other instance.
This does not mean that Sundahl’s “Cape Town approach” has run
its course, for there are other industries, whether space assets or oil
rigs, where similar consensus might be reached and a protocol
adopted.  It does mean that this neither presages broader convergence
as to secured transactions legal regimes, nor the start of a genuine,
frank, and open discussion and debate over the values that might un-
215. Luxembourg Protocol to the Convention on International Interests in Mobile Equipment
on Matters Specific to Railway Rolling Stock, INT’L INST. FOR UNIFICATION PRIVATE LAW, http://
www.unidroit.org/english/implement/i-2007-railprotocol.pdf (last visited Oct. 30, 2011).  It is fair
to point out that the cross border traffic in railway stock is more significant in Europe than it is
elsewhere, and certainly more important than it would be in North America.
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derlie them.  This is at least partly because America adheres as tightly
before Cape Town as after to its Code-inspired commercial religion.
IV. THE CODE AND THE CISG
It could fairly be asked whether the adherence to Code as religious
doctrine is truly a problem that infects commercial uniformity
broadly, or whether there happens to be a single area, namely that of
secured transactions, where the United States has been unusually
stubborn.  After all, as concerns the sale of goods, there exists a treaty
to which the United States is signatory, the CISG, which could not be
fairly described as merely replicating American notions of commercial
order.216  Moreover, while the CISG is not universally adopted, or
even nearly so, its adoption has been sufficiently broad and wide-
spread that it is self-evidently an international legal obligation that
reflects the interests of more than the United States.217
Yet the religious effect, caused by the hold of the Code, and in this
case Article 2 thereof, on the American commercial imagination is
quite real and limits the achievement of true harmonization of systems
involving the sale of goods.  This is because while the CISG may be
formally ratified, all too often it ends up in judicial application being
more mirage than expression of transnational harmony.  This Part de-
scribes how and why this is.
216. See FARNSWORTH, supra note 50, § 1.9, at 34 (noting that CISG “displaces much of Arti-
cle 2” of the Code).
217. See Kritzer, supra note 32.  While virtually all states in the world are involved in some
cross border trade, less than half of the world has adopted the CISG.  Exceptions are by no
means marginal countries and include all of South Asia, Southeast Asia (except Singapore), a
great deal of the Arab world and Africa. Id. Of the largest eight nations by population, only two
(the United States and China) are signatories. Id.  Three of the world’s largest ten economies
are likewise not parties. Id.  This can be contrasted with the Convention for the International
Enforcement of Arbitral Awards (the New York Convention) ratified by 145 nations, and the
International Covenant of Civil and Political Rights, ratified by 167 nations.  Ironically, the re-
fusal of one state, the United Kingdom, to adopt the CISG may relate to its own excessive
enchantment with its own domestic legal system.  In explaining why the United Kingdom has yet
to accede to the CISG, a leading commentator in an intriguing article suggests that the reasons
may have to do with English “pride in its longstanding common law legal imperialism or in its
long-treasured feeling of the superiority of English law to anything else that could even chal-
lenge it.”  A.F.M. Maniruzzaman, Formation of International Sales Contracts: A Comparative
Perspective, 29 INT. BUS. LAW. 483, 489 (2001). The notion is not altogether different from that
which I have posited in the American context; namely, that combination of certainty, intransi-
gence and unwillingness to compromise that motivates the believer in matters of core religious
doctrine.
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A. Understanding the CISG “Through a Domestic Lens”
Given the extensive domestic adherence to the Code, described
above, it should not be a surprise that the CISG has received anything
but a welcome reception in U.S. courts.  Rather, as many scholars
have noted,218 and in Murray’s memorable words in a laudable, brief
comment on the subject ten years after the CISG came into force,
courts have tended to “neglect” the CISG and view it “through the
lens of domestic law.”219
The point is important and requires elaboration.  To any realist ac-
customed to giving praxis primacy over form, there is little that is uni-
form about the CISG given the manner in which it is treated in
American courts.  Uniformity in formal ratification may be interest-
ing, but ultimately, if it does not lead to the attendant benefits of cer-
tainty and predictability across jurisdictions, it is of little use.  If the
uniformity is only in text but not in application in any given set of
factual circumstances, then it is no uniformity at all, not to a commer-
cial actor seeking to engage in cross border commerce and not to a
commercial lawyer seeking to advise that actor.
Thus, developing nations may have broadly acceded to the New
York Convention, as market signal if for no other reason, to signify
that the state in question is “open for business” as it were.220  But one
need not travel far in the developing world to find myriad examples of
domestic courts patently refusing to honor international arbitral
awards on “public policy” exceptions, permitted by the New York
Convention, that no court in the United States, for example, would
take remotely seriously.221  The same may well be said of applications
of the UNICTRAL Model Law when stays of domestic proceedings in
deference of arbitration provisions are sought.222
It would be convenient to dismiss this as merely byproduct of devel-
oping world judiciaries unable to grasp the complexities of interna-
tional trade and finance—nothing more, that is, than an example of
the difficulty in implementing the rule of law in the world’s benighted
regions.  Such a conclusion would, however, be unjustified.  The
United States has shown no more practical uniformity in its interpre-
tations of the CISG than the developing world has over the New York
Convention.223  Thus, even with its independent judiciary, its embrace
218. See infra notes 262–65 and accompanying text.
219. John Murray, The Neglect of CISG: A Workable Solution, 17 J. L. COMM. 365, 371 (1998).
220. See supra note 203.
221. Mallat, supra note 34.
222. Id.
223. See Murray, supra note 219, at 365–66.
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of the rule of law, its relative friendliness to the modalities of interna-
tional commerce and finance, which after all have served it quite well,
the United States, and more particularly its courts, have managed to
interpret the CISG more often than not as little more than a some-
what imperfect reflection of their own domestic legislation.  This is in
marked contrast to the Code, whose urtext is interpreted, broadly
speaking, quite uniformly, and where courts routinely refer to their
sister jurisdictions in approaching the Holy Text.
A simple comparison of two Seventh Circuit decisions illustrates the
distinction as between domestic uniformity in Code application and
international heterogeneity in CISG interpretation quite well.  First, to
the Code:  In the well known case of Northrop v. Litrionic Indus., the
Seventh Circuit was faced with a central difficulty in the interpretation
of § 2-207, its famous “battle of the forms” section, dealing with what
terms of two boilerplate forms should be included as part of the con-
tract when terms on the forms conflict.224
Subsection two of that famous section discusses how to deal with
“additional” terms but not different ones, leaving something of a gap
that required filling.225  As the Northrop case notes, state courts in
various jurisdictions have adopted three different approaches.226  The
first, adopted by the majority of state jurisdictions, employs what is
known as a “knockout” rule, wherein the conflicting terms are both
removed from the contract.227  A second approach, adopted in some
jurisdictions, is known as the “first shot” rule, and results in the re-
moval of the offeree’s conflicting term.228  The third option, favored
by the Northrop court, as the most harmonious with the Code’s lan-
guage and its intent, is to treat the offeree’s different terms as addi-
tional terms and then adopt the analysis of subsection two.229  Writing
for the court, however, Judge Posner decided not to employ his own
favored approach (after describing its advantages at some length), for
two reasons.230  The first, and less interesting, reason was the court’s
determination that Illinois generally adopts the rule of a majority of
jurisdictions, and the court was sitting in diversity and therefore was
required to use the same approach.231  More importantly, Judge Pos-
ner pointed out that the Code strives to maintain interstate uniform-
224. Northrop Corp. v. Litronic Indus., 29 F.3d. 1173, 1180 (7th Cir. 1994).
225. Id. at 1175.
226. Id. at 1178.
227. Id.
228. Id.
229. Northrop, 29 F.3d at 1178.
230.  Id.
231. Id.
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ity, and that therefore the court would presume that Illinois would
adopt the majority rule if offered the choice.232 In other words, effec-
tively left free to use any approach it wanted on a matter of Code
interpretation where Illinois had not spoken, the court opted for uni-
formity across state jurisdictions, not because the rule was the correct
one (in fact, the court described it as “imperfect”) but rather because
it would create uniformity, the proper approach to use in all circum-
stances except where the majority application happened to be “down-
right bad.”233  The motivation for uniformity thus appears remarkably
strong.
Of course, courts on occasion divide in their interpretations of the
Code’s sacred text.  Clearly they have on the question discussed
above, even if Illinois adheres to the majority view in the hopes of
maximizing the possibility of uniformity.  There are other issues re-
specting Article 2 where there are jurisdictional splits. The states have
different views, for example on whether or not an implied warranty of
merchantability may be extended by a buyer to a remote seller not in
privity with the buyer.234  The applicability of the doctrine of estoppel
to matters arising under the Code’s Statute of Frauds is yet another
example.235
Similarly, religious believers might split over the finer points of
scripture.  Sunni Muslim doctrine, as we have said, was traditionally
determined by four Sunni schools, thereby implying some level of
deviation, and Shi’i Muslim doctrine is determined by some limited
and finite set of high clerics who do disagree with one another at
times.236  To hold the doctrine sacred and to adopt it as a form of
religious observance does not preclude the possibility of diverging in-
terpretations of the same sacred doctrine.  However, it does limit the
levels of deviation, as believers and courts alike strive, when applying
sacred text, to remain in some level of uniformity with others so as to
ensure doctrinal integrity.
232. Id.
233. Id.
234. Compare Morrow v. New Moon Homes, Inc., 548 P.2d 279 (Alaska 1976) (holding that
nonprivity manufacturer may be held liable for breach of implied warranty of merchantability)
with Tex Enters., Inc. v. Brockway Standard, Inc., 66 P.3d 625 (Wash. 2003) (concluding the
opposite).
235. Compare Lige Dickson Co. v. Union Oil Co. of Cal., 635 P.2d 103 (Wash. 1981) (holding
estoppel inapplicable) with Decatur Coop. Assoc. v. Urban, 547 P.2d. 323 (Kan. 1976) (holding
estoppel applicable).
236. An example exists in Shi’i Islam respecting the ritual cleanliness of people of other faiths.
See Haider Ala Hamoudi, Between Realism and Resistance: Shi’i Islam and the Contemporary
Liberal State, 11 J. ISLAMIC L. & CULTURE 107, 118 (2009).
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The same interest in uniformity does not apply as to international
uniformity and the CISG, in the slightest.  In the widely criticized Chi-
cago Prime Packers decision, the Seventh Circuit, this time interpret-
ing the CISG, shows no regard for uniformity at all.237  To be clear,
and to reemphasize the point, the issue is not so much a court misun-
derstanding a foreign legal precept, thereby applying it incorrectly, or
failing to take due account of context.  This, as I have noted, is almost
inevitable whenever a court is forced to deal with a law with which it
is unfamiliar.  Rather, as is demonstrated below, it is a matter of
courts startlingly, and openly, refusing to even try to interpret the pre-
vailing law of the land. The contempt this entails for an international
treaty thereby surpasses normal expressions of parochialism.
In Prime Packers, a U.S. seller sued a Canadian buyer over spoiled
ribs for which the buyer refused to pay, claiming that the ribs were not
spoiled when delivered.238  While Article 36 of the CISG is reasonably
clear that the seller is liable as to a nonconformity at the time of deliv-
ery, the issue in the case was instead over who bore the burden of
proof to establish the alleged nonconformity, a matter on which the
court determined the CISG was not clear.239
The Seventh Circuit could have adopted an approach similar to that
which it employed in Northrop. It could have done this by accessing
decisions of various nations to determine different approaches, easily
done through the massive, impressive library of cases provided online
by the Pace University School of Law CISG database, specifically
cited in a 1998 Eleventh Circuit decision as being “a promising
source.”240  Even if it considered itself too busy to refer to the Pace
website, foreign law sources were available: the district court had re-
ferred to no less than seven foreign cases,241 leading some to conclude
that perhaps the tide was turning on the use of foreign law in CISG
cases.242  Other resources might well be referred to as well in the in-
237. See BENFIELD, JR. & GREENFIELD, supra note 13, at 379; Shani Salama, Pragmatic Re-
sponses to Interpretive Impediments: Article 7 of the CISG, an Inter-American Application, 38 U.
MIAMI INTER-AM. L. REV. 225, 248 (2006).
238. Chi. Prime Packers, Inc. v. Northam Food Trading Co., 408 F.3d 894, 897 (7th Cir. 2005).
239. Id. at 898.
240. MCC-Marble Ceramic Ctr., Inc. v. Ceramica Nuova D’Agostino, S.p.A., 144 F.3d 1384,
1390 n.14 (11th Cir. 1998).
241. Chi. Prime Packers, Inc. v. Northam Food Trading Co., 320 F. Supp. 2d 702 (N.D. Ill.
2003).
242. Annabel Teiling, CISG: U.S. Court Relies on Foreign Case Law and the Internet, 2 UNI-
FORM L. REV./REVUE DE DROIT UNIFORME 431, 431–35 (2004), available at http://cisgw3.law.
pace.edu/cisg/biblio/teiling.html; Harry M. Flechtner, The CISG in U.S. Courts: The Evolution
(and Devolution) of the Methodology of Interpretation, in QUO VADIS CISG: CELEBRATING THE
25TH ANNIVERSARY OF THE UNITED NATIONS CONVENTION ON CONTRACTS FOR THE INTERNA-
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terests of ensuring a pan-national approach, among them globally
respected scholarly authorities.243  One would expect something like
this type of effort.  After all, the CISG has the promotion of uniform-
ity as a central goal, precisely as the Code does, suggesting that the
courts of other states, as well as globally respected authorities, must
be deeply relevant to reaching the proper outcome.244
Instead, the court adopted an entirely different approach to “inter-
preting” the CISG, in derogation of the district court’s attempt to find
authority in foreign law.  Essentially, it refused to apply it.  First, the
court referred sensibly enough to the “gap filler” provision of Article
7(2) of the CISG, which refers courts first to the “general principles”
on which it is based (and which, it should be noted, follows immedi-
ately the requirement that courts interpret the CISG with a view to
promoting uniformity).245  Those general principles, the court deter-
mined, could be found in the Code, America’s sacred text. Moreover,
the CISG, the court incredibly found, was the “international ana-
logue” to the Code’s Article 2.246  Many of its provisions were “the
same or similar.”247  The Code, and American case law under it, could
thus be used to interpret “analogous provisions” under the CISG,
though the Code was not “per se applicable.”248  The remainder of the
case applies the Code exclusively, as if it were the applicable law.249
Whatever progress the district court had made in its liberal use of for-
eign authority, the Seventh Circuit effectively reversed.
Moreover, in light of the lack of foreign authority, it is difficult to
understand precisely what the court means when it declares that the
Code’s cases are not “per se applicable.”250  If the only sources of law
the court used were the CISG’s text and the Code, then this all but
renders the Code per se applicable, except where the text of the CISG
mandates a different result.  That is, presumably, a “per se applicable”
TIONAL SALE OF GOODS 91, 94 (Franco Ferrari ed. 2005); Francesco Mazzotta, Why do Some
American Courts Fail To Get It Right?, 3 LOY. U. CHI. INT’L L. REV. 85, 100 (2005).
243. The most prominent of these is the inestimable late Professor Honnold, whose work on
the CISG is unparalleled. See generally JOHN O. HONNOLD, UNIFORM LAW FOR INTERNA-
TIONAL SALES UNDER THE 1980 UNITED NATIONS CONVENTION (3d ed. 1999), available at http://
www.cisg.law.pace.edu/cisg/biblio/honnold.html.
244. United Nations Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods art. 7(a),
Apr. 11, 1980, 1489 U.N.T.S. 3, available at http://www.uncitral.org/pdf/english/texts/sales/cisg/
V1056997-CISG-e-book.pdf [hereinafter CISG].
245. Chi. Prime Packers, Inc. v. Northam Food Trading Co., 408 F.3d 894, 898 (7th Cir. 2005);
CISG art. 2.
246. Prime Packers, 408 F.3d at 898.
247. Id.
248. Id.
249. See generally id. at 898–900.
250. Id. at 898.
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rule would be one wherein, in the absence of a clear provision in the
CISG, the rules of the Code would apply automatically.  Under this
approach, Articles 35 and 36 dealing with breach of warranty under
the CISG would not provide a clear rule on burden of proof, in which
case the Code would be deemed “per se applicable” and the matter
interpreted according to the Code’s warranty provisions.  The court
instead declared that there was no per se applicability but that in the
case of ambiguity in a provision of the CISG, an analogous provision
in the Code would be applied as the sole interpretive tool.251  In either
case, the result appears to be precisely the same: the Code is to be
applied, unless the CISG has a provision that clearly indicates
otherwise.
To describe this as creating any sort of reasonable “uniformity” on a
global scale is an impossible proposition to sustain.  We may safely
presume, after all, that the courts of other nations do not view the
CISG as “international analogue” to the Code and are not likely
therefore to reach similar conclusions except by mere happenstance.
Certainly it seems unlikely that even if they knew the American inter-
pretation they would deign to follow it given the parochialism of the
reasoning.
Lest such an approach be dismissed as unique, the Court’s theory is
adopted from an earlier Second Circuit case decided in 1995, Delchi v.
Rotorex.252  The Second Circuit is more circumspect, but ultimately
reaches the same effective conclusion—the Code applies when the
text of the CISG is unclear. Specifically, the court reasons as follows:
Because there is virtually no caselaw under the Convention, we look
to its language and to “the general principles” upon which it is
based.  The Convention directs that its interpretation be informed
by its “international character and . . . the need to promote uniform-
ity in its application and the observance of good faith in interna-
tional trade.”  Caselaw interpreting analogous provisions of Article
2 of the . . . UCC, may also inform a court where the language of the
relevant CISG provisions tracks that of the UCC.  However, UCC
caselaw “is not per se applicable.”253
In the first place, there is some irony in the final quoted line above
because it references a U.S. Court of International Trade case to come
to the conclusion that the Code is “not per se applicable” to cases
decided under an international treaty designed to create international
uniformity. It would be no less appropriate, after all, to cite a German
251. Prime Packers, 408 F.3d at 898.
252. Delchi Carrier SpA v. Rotorex Corp., 71 F.3d 1024, 1027–28 (2d Cir. 1995).
253. Id. (citations omitted).
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case thereafter which indicates that cases decided under the BGB may
also be used even if they are not, similarly, “per se applicable.”
More centrally, the entire passage is an incoherent and self-contra-
dictory jumble.  From the first sentence, we know to look to the lan-
guage of the CISG and to “general principles,” which are not entirely
defined.254  The second sentence appears to provide some sort of gui-
dance on general principles by suggesting that interpretation should
be used “to promote uniformity in its application and the observance
of good faith in international trade.”255  Yet in direct contradiction,
the next sentence refers us to the Code,256 which clearly is not going to
lead to any sort of reasonable international uniformity, for the simple
reason that no court outside the United States would pay very much
attention to it.
It is possible that the court meant only to apply the Code when
international uniformity itself was difficult to ascertain.  Yet this
hardly seems to be the case, because the court does not seem con-
cerned by international precedent.  According to the court, there is
“virtually no caselaw” under the CISG when in fact internationally by
1995, the date of the opinion, the number or recorded cases lay in the
hundreds.257  Clearly the court meant that there was no case law in the
United States; apparently it was not interested in looking elsewhere.
Thus, to paraphrase the Delchi court, to understand the language of
the CISG, one refers to general principles.  These general principles
should preserve some level of international uniformity.  However, to
determine this international uniformity, neither international case law
nor other international material will be accessed. The court may in-
stead apply the Code, though it is not per se applicable, by the author-
ity of the U.S. Court of International Trade.  Where we end up after
this confusion, it seems, is not altogether far from what Chicago Prime
Packers implicitly derived as the relevant method of interpretation—
the Code applies except when the language of the CISG clearly sug-
gests otherwise.
In application, the Delchi court appears to have gone further still,
effectively varying the words of the CISG to conform to American ex-
pectations. Article 74 of the CISG indicates quite plainly that dam-
ages that arise as a “possible consequence” of a party’s breach are
254. Id.
255. Id.
256. Id.
257. CISG Database: Yearbook of CISG Cases: 1994-1993-1992-1991-1990, PACE L. SCH. INST.
INT’L COM. L., http://www.cisg.law.pace.edu/cisg/text/YB1994-1990.html (last visited Nov. 23,
2011).
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recoverable by the injured party.258  Yet the court suggests that the
CISG adopts the “familiar principle of foreseeability” contained in the
common law, and specifically the case of Hadley v. Baxendale, which
limits damages to those incurred as a probable consequence of the
breach.259  The court does not so much as remark on the important
linguistic distinction, certain as it is that what the CISG has done is
incorporate the wisdom of the common law.
Elsewhere, in deciding whether to include fixed and variable costs
for lost profits calculations, the court blesses the adoption of what it
calls the “standard formula employed by most American courts,” for
no reason other than the absence of a provision under the CISG.260
So much, then, for the “general principles” and international uniform-
ity.  By the time the opinion nears its end, given the relentless domes-
tic focus, it seems as if the court has forgotten entirely that it is
interpreting a treaty.261  It examines incidental and consequential
damages under the provisions of the Code using its own Code case
law without so much as reference to the CISG.262  The courts, it
seems, cannot imagine using rules other than those set forth in the
sacred text, and at times do not even pretend to try.  These two Cir-
cuits are only examples.  Others following them on their authority ex-
ist as well.263
B. The Irrational and the Contemptuous
It must be noted that the tendency to apply domestic law in inter-
preting an international treaty is not a problem of which the scholarly
community is unaware.  As early as 1989, Professor Honnold adopted
a term to describe this disturbing tendency, the “homeward trend,”
that has been used subsequently.264  In 1999, a pessimistic commenta-
tor noted “the CISG does not bring uniformity to the law of interna-
258. CISG art. 74.
259. Delchi, 71 F.3d at 1029; see also Hadley v. Baxendale, (1854) 156 Eng. Rep. 145 (Ex.),
available at http://www.law.berkeley.edu/faculty/rubinfeldd/LS145/hadley.html.  Murray refers to
this error as well.  Murray, supra note 219, at 370.
260. Delchi, 71 F.3d at 1030.
261. See generally id. at 1030–31.
262. Id.
263. See, e.g., Raw Materials, Inc. v. Manfred Forberich GMBH & Co., 53 Fed. R. Serv. 2d
(Callaghan) 878 (N.D. Ill. 2004) (following Seventh Circuit); Genpharm, Inc. v. Pliva-Lachema,
361 F. Supp. 2d 49 (E.D.N.Y. 2005) (following Second Circuit).
264. JOHN HONNOLD, DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE UNIFORM LAW FOR INTERNATIONAL
SALES 1 (1989). See also DiMatteo et al., The Interpretive Turn in International Sales Law: An
Analysis of Fifteen Years of CISG Jurisprudence, 24 NW. J. INT’L L. & BUS. 299, 437–39 (2004)
(describing the “persistence of homeward trend”).
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tional sales but instead fosters disharmony based on ignorance.”265
Later reports are hardly more promising.266  In a particularly excellent
article discussing this problem at length, Professor Flechtner describes
the tendency of American courts to understand CISG doctrine
through reference to the Code to be a form of “hallucination.”267
As a result, the point here is not merely to repeat that which these
excellent commentators have described, but to understand more thor-
oughly precisely why despite over a decade of criticism, American
courts268 have been unable to gravitate to anything approaching the
uniformity in international sales that they have achieved quite well
concerning domestic sales, and why their hostility to even trying seems
so extreme.  To understand this, a broader perspective is necessary,
one that examines more generally America’s largely stymied efforts to
bring about commercial uniformity in any number of areas, and its
concomitant attachment to the Code in nearly all instances.  The mat-
ter, as we have seen, is based on a form of religious certainty, an at-
tachment to a method of commercial dealing that is adhered to in a
manner that transcends the rational, and a refusal to reconsider these
general commercial norms even when they are rejected, or at least
broadly challenged, by other important segments within the interna-
tional community.
Stated differently, this is more than merely a problem of “home-
ward trend.”  It is a much broader hostility toward anything commer-
cial that is foreign in origin.  The severity and near irrationality of the
265. James E. Bailey, Facing the Truth: Seeing the Convention on Contracts for the Interna-
tional Sale of Goods as an Obstacle to a Uniform Law of International Sales, 32 CORNELL INT’L
L.J. 273, 281 (1999).
266. DiMatteo, supra note 264, at 437–39; Mazzotta, supra note 242, at 89–99 (2005); Salama,
supra note 237, at 226.
267. Flechtner, supra note 242, at 92.  Flechtner does point out that there are exceptions to
the broader trend I have identified above, though ironically, the cases he cites as offering the
most promising methodology are the Chicago Prime Packers case as decided in the district court
(the Seventh Circuit decision not having been issued at time of publication) and a separate case
in which the CISG was held not to apply. See Flechtner, supra 242, at 94, 97–98 (discussing the
case of Amco Ukrservice v. Am. Meter Co., 312 F. Supp. 2d 681 (E.D. Pa. 2004)).
268. Admittedly, this is not an issue that is limited entirely to American courts, as other courts
are likewise susceptible to the “homeward trend.” See, e.g., DiMatteo et al., supra note 264, at
303–04 (describing an Italian case); Flechtner, supra note 242 (describing Belgian case where,
ironically, rules of decision appear to arise neither in Belgium nor the CISG but rather from
common civilian provisions respecting hardship).  To this, two things may be said.  First of all, it
is not apparent that the problem is quite as serious elsewhere; one commentator describes Bel-
gian and Italian courts generally as being particularly promising in their willingness to achieve
international uniformity under the CISG, for example. See Mazzotta, supra note 242, at 90–91.
Secondly, I do not discount the possibility of a quasi form of religious adherence on the part of
civilian countries to their own civil codes, a matter which Fletcher has addressed at length in the
context of France and Germany.  Fletcher, supra note 1, at 11–18.
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unsympathetic reception of the CISG appears even when its interpre-
tation in contradistinction to that of the Code turns out not to be at
issue. The most memorable example comes in a case decided in the
Southern District of New York, Filanto v. Chilewich.269  The issue in
the case was whether or not the parties had agreed to arbitrate dis-
putes between them, under factual circumstances that involved a diz-
zying array of competing forms, correspondence, and written and oral
exchanges.  Ultimately, the prevailing legal issues were relatively easy
to resolve, because the court determined that one party had agreed to
another’s precise form, which included an arbitration clause.270  What
was more striking, however, was the disdain for the CISG and the
irrational attachment to the Code, under circumstances such attach-
ment seemed, to say the least, dramatically misplaced.
There are some things that might be said in defense of the opinion
and its treatment of the CISG.  While like the Second Circuit in
Delchi, the court felt it important to point out that there was virtually
no case law on the CISG, at least it qualified its statement by making
its reference exclusively to “U.S. case law.”271  This does not seem to
have induced the court to look elsewhere for source material, though
in the end it did not need to given the facts of the case.
Moreover, to its credit, and in sharp contrast with Delchi and Prime
Packers, the court was also wise enough to indicate that the general
principles of contract law did not include the Code.272  Were the same
court to decide the matter today, it would almost surely decide, as per
the Second Circuit’s suggestion in Delchi, that “general principles,”
referring in this context to Article 7(2) of the CISG, were indeed em-
bodied in the Code.273  Taken together with the dramatic reversal in
respect for foreign law in connection with the handling of the Prime
Packers case between the district court and the Seventh Circuit,274 this
seems to indicate that judicial overreliance on the Code to understand
the CISG is getting worse with time, rather than better.  That is to say,
even if the amount of case law in the U.S. increases in the future, this
may increase American familiarity with the CISG at the expense of
international uniformity as American courts stubbornly continue to
separate themselves on the basis of their own unique domestic appli-
269. Filanto, S.p.A. v. Chilewich Int’l Corp., 789 F. Supp. 1229 (S.D.N.Y. 1992).
270. Id. at 1239–40.
271. Id. at 1237.
272. Id. at 1237.
273. Delchi Carrier SpA v. Rotorex Corp., 71 F.3d 1024, 1027 (2d Cir. 1995).
274. See supra notes 240–49 and accompanying text.
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cations not of the CISG, but of the Code-inspired American commer-
cial religion.
Yet, whatever its merits, the Filanto decision could hardly be con-
sidered to be a particularly salutary exercise of CISG interpretation.
In undertaking a preliminary analysis of the party’s contentions, and
noting the position of the plaintiff seller respecting the differing forms,
material changes thereto, and § 2-207, the court indicates as follows in
a stunning passage:
Plaintiff Filanto’s interpretation of the evidence is rather different.
While Filanto apparently agrees that the March 13 Memorandum
Agreement was indeed an offer, it characterizes its August 7 return
of the signed Memorandum Agreement with the covering letter as a
counteroffer.  While defendant contends that under Uniform Com-
mercial Code § 2-207 this action would be viewed as an acceptance
with a proposal for a material modification, the Uniform Commer-
cial Code, as previously noted does not apply to this case, because
the State Department undertook to fix something that was not broken
by helping to create the Sale of Goods Convention which varies from
the Uniform Commercial Code in many significant ways.275
Two observations may be made.  The first is that the court seems
not to have the slightest appreciation for the importance of facilitating
some sort of international uniformity in commerce, dismissing any
such effort as fixing “something that was not broken.”276  The Code,
in other words, is sufficient, and whatever gains might exist in the har-
monization of laws respecting international commerce are far out-
weighed by the sinful creation of a monstrous heresy, the CISG, that,
horror of horrors, “varies from the . . . Code in many significant
ways.”277
The second is that the context of the statement respecting unbroken
Code is one that is very difficult to accord with reality, the product of
religious faith rather than empirical observation.  Under the facts as
plaintiff presents them, the matter concerns a writing which contains a
“different” term from that contained in the original agreement;
namely, one pursuant to which a requirement for arbitration was elim-
inated.  Under the supposedly “not broken” method of the Code, a
court would first need to determine what rule in the relevant jurisdic-
tion applied to “different” terms in conflicting forms—a “knockout
rule,” a “first shot rule,” or a rule treating additional and different
terms as synonymous and applying subsection two to both.278  If the
275. Filanto, 789 F. Supp. at 1238 (emphasis added).
276. Id.
277. Id.
278. See Northrop Corp. v. Litronic Indus., 29 F.3d. 1173, 1178 (7th Cir. 1994).
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first of these applies, the arbitration term is removed.  If the second
applies, the arbitration term is included.  If the third, then the ques-
tion turns on whether or not the arbitration term is material.
Hopefully, the third option does not turn out to be the one settled
upon, or the work will just have begun.  As Professor Farnsworth has
correctly noted, vast sums have been spent deciding issues of material-
ity in many contexts, among them arbitration.279  The matter is in
some jurisdictions held to be a question of fact for a jury to determine,
and in other jurisdictions it is assumed to be material, at least in par-
ticular industries at particular times.280
Thus, if the Code’s goals are simplicity, clarity, predictability, and
uniformity, it is fair to describe § 2-207, and in particular in this very
context, as deeply and fundamentally broken.  There is nothing simple
about the analysis, nothing predictable about the outcome, and noth-
ing uniform given the vast multiplicity of rules applied in the various
jurisdictions on just this matter.  The reason to favor the Code has
nothing to do with it not being broken; it has to do with adhering to it
for its own sake, for the totemic value of its sacred words as opposed
to those of the CISG.
After all, even the drafters of the Code offer no defense of § 2-207
and in fact one is on record criticizing the professoriate precisely for
holding the section in too much reverence. In a letter to the inestima-
ble Professor Robert Summers, the equally inestimable Professor
Grant Gilmore writes:
I do think that insufficient attention has been paid to the tangled
drafting history of 2-207 . . . . The point is that as late as the 1952
draft of the Code, 2-207 consisted only of what are now subsections
(1) and (2). Subsection (3) was added in response to criticisms of the
New York Law Revision Commission (which were probably based
on suggestions by John Honnold, who acted as a consultant on Arti-
cle 2 for the Commission). The 1952 version of 2-207 was bad
enough (particularly in the (2)(b) reference to “material alteration”)
but the addition of subsection (3), without the slightest explanation
of how it was supposed to mesh with (1) and (2), turned the section
into a complete disaster . . . .
My principal quarrel with your discussion of 2-207 - and all the other
discussions I have read - is that you treat the section much too re-
spectfully - as if it had had sprung, all of a piece, like Minerva from
the brow of Jove. The truth is that it was a miserable, bungled,
patched-up job - both text and comment . . . .
. . . .
279. FARNSWORTH, supra note 50, § 3.21, at 166.
280. Id.
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. . . . Perhaps there was something to be said for the common law
rules of offer and acceptance. At all events: Down with  2-207.281
The irony should be obvious.  One of the principal drafters of the
Code is decrying religious-like reverence to the Code (hence the color-
ful mythological reference to Minerva springing from the brow of
Jove), in particular as concerns § 2-207, and even more specifically, as
concerns the question of material alteration in subsection two.  Gil-
more describes it as “the greatest statutory mess of all time.”282  And
about two decades later, a prestigious federal district court, presided
over by one its sharpest legal minds over the past century,283 faced
with a set of facts which demonstrate the extent of the incoherence
over the section, and over that piece of the section specifically decried
by Gilmore, ridicules the very existence of the CISG on the grounds
that the Code is “not broken.”284  The religion runs deep, so deep that
even the drafters themselves cannot seem to dislodge it, any more
than a believer can dispense readily with a verse of a Holy Book, even
one whose content makes them uncomfortable.
To add to the irony, it might behoove us to investigate the outcome
of the factual scenario posited by the Filanto court if the CISG were to
apply, now that, as the court has indicated, the State Department had
“fix[ed]” the unbroken section.285  The matter is simply, and uni-
formly, resolved under Article 19.286  The August 7 response letter
contained a change respecting dispute resolution provisions to the ear-
lier correspondence.287  Under subsection three of Article 19 of the
CISG, such a change is material, and under subsections one and two,
acceptances providing material changes to offers constitute counterof-
fers.288  The August 7 response letter would therefore plainly be a
counteroffer under plaintiff’s version of the facts.
Thus, what any rational analysis could conclude, and what Gilmore
himself determined, was inexorably broken was, by the enactment of
several lines of CISG text, fixed quite well.  If, that is, the matter
could be approached rationally.
281. Gilmore Letter, supra note 9, at 723–25 (emphasis added).
282. Id.
283. The Judge deciding the Filanto case was Chief Judge Charles Brieant, so respected that
after his death, the courthouse in White Plains, New York was named after him. See The Hon.
Charles L. Brieant Jr. Federal Building and Courthouse White Plains, New York, U.S. DISTRICT
COURT S. DISTRICT N.Y., http://www.nysd.uscourts.gov/site_whiteplains.php (last visited Nov. 6,
2011).
284. Filanto, 789 F. Supp. at 1137.
285. Id. at 1238.
286. Id.
287. See id.
288. See CISG art. 19.
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To be clear, the issue is not any praise offered to § 2-207 by the
Filanto court.  The court does not in fact laud the provision, and in any
event other commentators and courts have in cases other than Filanto
criticized § 2-207.  Rather, the problem demonstrated in Filanto that is
deserving of attention is that when invited to consider an alternative
model, one that plainly dealt with the problems of competing forms
better, the Court not only could not bring itself to acknowledge that
fact, but dismissed the entire CISG as unnecessary.
It is always easier to find fault with one’s Holy Text than it is to
adopt another.  A religious Jew or Muslim , for example, might ac-
knowledge discomfort with provisions of the Torah or Qur’an that
seem to permit slavery or condemn homosexuality.  It is quite another
matter, however, to expect that person to admit the superiority of a
competing Holy Book even if it were to address those issues in a fash-
ion the believer found normatively appealing.  This is because funda-
mentalist attachment to the Word is not merely about piecemeal
adherence to appealing provisions, or those that suit from a normative
or economic perspective.  It is more entire than that; it is direct and
full obedience to a comprehensive set of ideas, and an immediate and
innate rejection of all that might conflict.  So it was with Filanto.289
V. CONCLUSION
To grasp the nature of the dilemma facing global commercial prac-
tice because of America’s quasi religious reverence to the Code as a
form of sacred, canonical text, it is important to place the matter in its
geographical and temporal context.  The trends toward commercial
uniformity in the two areas described in this Article in particular, ar-
eas in which there is growing need for some form of transnational
resolution, are not encouraging.  In the case of secured transactions,
any hope of global convergence remains quite distant.  There is only a
legislative guide produced by UNCITRAL,290 whose influence is diffi-
cult to gauge, and a broad U.N. Convention which has only four signa-
tories, the United States, Luxembourg, Liberia, and Madagascar.291
Europe has yet to harmonize its own systems internally,292 and virtu-
ally none of Latin America has adopted the Model Law promulgated
by the Organization of American States, at least not without broad
289.  Id.
290. See UNCITRAL Legislative Guide, supra note 173.
291. Status 2001, supra note 210.
292. See sources cited in supra note 206.
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revisions thereto.293  The gradualist Cape Town approach has led to
agreement on aircraft financing, which is helpful, but quite limited.294
If credit security is as fundamental to economic well being as its most
zealous proselytizers seem to believe, then the time to engage seri-
ously on a form of broader harmonization has been upon us for some
time.
There can be no doubt that efforts have been undertaken, but one
can ask whether or not they constitute engagement.  Engagement re-
quires exchange, and even those who should be the natural allies of
the United States, such as the Asian Development Bank, which like
all financial institutions stands much to gain from advancing secured
transaction law, have recoiled from the United States efforts,295 which
seem to be forever engaged in earnestly promoting its certainties that
Article 9 is “the best commercial law statute ever”296 and wondering
aloud why the rest of the world has not simply adopted the American
transplant.297  In any other context, such sentiments would be re-
garded as ridiculous.  One can only imagine the reaction if President
Bush, himself accused of trying to make Iraq in his own image, de-
clared America’s Constitution to be “the best ever” and if America’s
viceroy in Iraq, L. Paul Bremer,298 had subsequently held a confer-
ence entitled “Why Isn’t Iraq Adopting the U.S. Constitution?
Should It?”  The Bush Administration was broadly indicted for far
lesser sins.299  Such proselytization, it seems, escapes public notice in
matters of commerce.
And so we persist.  Undeterred as proselytizers who cannot seem to
convert very many to their one true  faith, America’s commercial law
faithful remain steadfastly dedicated to the Code as godhead, necessa-
rily “not broken” even under circumstances where all indications are
to the contrary.  Such an approach might be entirely legitimate for the
missionary convinced that she is saving the souls of the damned, but it
is not a basis upon which commercial uniformity can be achieved on a
global scale.
293. Kozolchyk, supra note 199, at 725–30; Rosenberg, supra note 205, at 230; Rocks & Saw-
yer, supra note 206, at 1657; Moglia Claps & McDonnell, supra note 204, at 398.
294. See notes 210–14 and accompanying text.
295.  GOSWAMI & SHARIF, supra note 208.
296. WARREN & WALT, supra note 29, at 11; Harris & Mooney, supra note 169, at 2021.
297. See supra Part III(D).
298. See Haider Ala Hamoudi, Money Laundering Amidst Mortars: Legislative Process and
State Authority in Post-Invasion Iraq, 16 TRANSNAT’L L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 523, 526 (2007)
(describing role of Bremer).
299. Id. at 528 n.22 (discussing putative legality of legislative orders made by American insti-
tuted authorities in Iraq).
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Limited, regional practices, such as Islamic finance, destined to re-
main largely insular to a devout community and hardly constituting a
framework for a new global economic system (even if its proponents
would like to believe otherwise) may comfortably remain religious in
their orientation, certain of their rectitude and viewing compromise as
a form of “defeatist” heresy.300  The United States can hardly afford
the same result.  Even as American commercial actors must suffer the
peculiarities of nonuniform secured transaction laws around the globe,
so must developing economies suffer a lack of investment for the same
reason.
The resistance to a more syncretic approach, however, is deep and
well nigh implacable.  It runs not only among commercial lawyers and
much of the professoriate, but as we have seen, to the judiciary as
well.  Our courts are hostile to the very notion of international com-
mercial harmonization of any sort, even over matters that are less ideo-
logically fraught than secured transactions.301  While the broad
ideological harmony over the nature of sales as opposed to the bene-
fits to be gained from secured transactions may explain why there is a
CISG, it does not detract from the fact that the CISG is all too often
less an actual binding treaty and more a text upon which the Code is
imposed, to fill gaps, to interpret provisions, and even, in the Second
Circuit, to qualify those provisions.  Absent a provision of absolute
clarity in the CISG (for example, its effective repeal of the Statute of
Frauds),302 the approaches we have seen in the Second and Seventh
Circuits do little more than offer lip service to international harmoni-
zation, and instead rely nearly exclusively on the Code and cases de-
cided under it to derive their conclusions.303  In worse cases, the very
notion of the CISG is derided, on the specious ground that somehow,
§ 2-207 works fine, and somehow, that is the case even when the draft-
ers themselves not only do not think so, indeed when the prophet-
drafters criticize us for imagining that the clause arose as Minerva
from Jove’s brow.304  To defend the clause under such circumstances
requires religious faith, as there is no rational basis upon which it can
otherwise be defended.
“Homeward trends” undoubtedly exist with respect to any treaty.
However if any other convention (say, the International Covenant on
300. See supra Part (II)(C).
301. See supra Part (IV).
302. CISG art. 11 (clearly repudiating requirements of a writing to evidence a contract).
303. See supra Part (IV)(B) (describing Delchi and Prime Packers cases).
304. Gilmore Letter, supra note 9, at 723–25.
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Civil and Political Rights)305 had some of its key provisions ignored as
broadly as the CISG, on the theory that the treaty was merely the
“international analogue”306 of something domestic (say, American
anti-discrimination legislation), the outcry, it can be said, would be
greater.  Again, similar approaches seem to escape public notice when
they deal with commercial matters.
Describing a comparable situation in the United Kingdom concern-
ing its refusal to enact the CISG, a prominent commentator indicated
as follows:
Although the English common law of contract, like any other
branch of English law, was considered to be influential in many
parts of the world, especially the commonwealth and common law
jurisdictions, such complacency should no longer exist in light of the
recent move towards the globalisation and liberalisation of interna-
tional trade.  The United Kingdom has not yet ratified the CISG,
perhaps because of pride in its longstanding common law legal im-
perialism or in its long-treasured feeling of the superiority of En-
glish law to anything else that could even challenge it . . . .
With the anticipated acceleration of globalisation and liberalisa-
tion movements in the near future, there will be a greater demand
for the global harmonization of commercial law.  In such a situation,
the insular attitude of the United Kingdom to the harmonization
phenomenon is, in fact, regrettable.  The time has come to wake up
and face reality, and deal with it effectively.
The world has so far been deprived of the reputable talent of
British judges and lawyers in the matter of interpretation of the
CISG which could have influenced the harmonization process in ju-
dicial decisions in the same way as the common law has in many
countries.307
Precisely the same may fairly be said, mutatis mutandis as concerns
the United States, and with respect to a far greater scope of commer-
cial activities.  Our ability to influence the outcomes concerning both
a secured transactions law, and a more truly uniform CISG are greater
now than they are likely to be at any time in the foreseeable future.
Yet the opportunity is squandered by our adherence to our commer-
cial religion, and our concomitant refusal to countenance anything but
a global Revised Article 9 in the one case, and the adoption of judicial
reasoning that no court beyond the United States would find remotely
appealing in the other.  It would be unfortunate, indeed tragic, if the
305. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, adopted Dec. 16, 1966, S. Exec.
Doc. E, 95-2 (19878), 999 U.N.T.S. 171 (entered into force Mar. 3, 1976); available at http://
www2.ohchr.org/english/law/ccpr.htm.
306. See Chi. Prime Packers, Inc. v. Northam Food Trading Co., 408 F.3d 894, 898 (7th Cir.
2005).
307. Maniruzzaman, supra note 217.
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Code which served America so well in the latter half of the last cen-
tury prevented its ability to develop a new Code, no less uniform in
text and application, but of far broader scope.  The challenges are
great, but they can be surmounted. To turn the words of Filanto court
around on their head, the system is quite broken.308  We need a new
religion.
308. See Filanto, S.p.A. v. Chilewich Int’l Corp., 789 F. Supp. 1229, 1289 (S.D.N.Y. 1992).
